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I. INTRODUCTION

In West Virginia, actions against health care providers for injuries to patients are governed by the Medical Professional Liability Act ("MPLA").1 This
Article will discuss the MPLA and its amendments, the developing case law
from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and federal courts in West
Virginia, and other legislation related to health care litigation. 2 This Article is
intended for the West Virginia MPLA practitioner and focuses on what the law
is and how the MPLA has been interpreted, as opposed to debating the relative
merits of the MPLA or civil justice or medical negligence field. That task is left
to the capable efforts of others.3
1986 W. Va. Acts 791-96, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-1, et seq. (LexisNexis
1
1994).
2
A prior article examined this subject up to and including the amendments passed in 2001, so
this Article, hopefully, will pick up where the last one left off. Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. & Rob J.
Aliff, Medical ProfessionalLiability in West Virginia, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 369 (2003). See also,
Thomas J. Hurney, Jr., Hospital Liability in West Virginia, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 943 (1993). For a
solid review of West Virginia law prior to the MPLA, read Mike Farrell's seminal article. Michael J. Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpracticein West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 251 (1979).
For a comprehensive review, see LAURIE GARRIGAN MCKOwEN, THE LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IN WEST VIRGINIA (2010).

3
See generally, Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the
Effects of Medical Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live with Inefficient
Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 11 (1991); Anthony J. DeFrank & Allan S. Hammock, The Health
Care Crisis and Medical Liability in West Virginia, 7 W. VA. PUB. AFF. REP. 1 (Winter 1990);

Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons

from

West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (2008). See also Tom Baker, THE MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); Mark A. Behrens, Medical Liability Reform: A Case Study of Mississippi, 118:2 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 335 (Aug. 2011) (analyzing statistics from states'

major malpractice carriers, and concluding that Mississippi's tort reform laws were associated
with a "steep drop in lawsuits," particularly against "OB-GYNs", as well as medical liability pre-
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II. THE PASSAGE OF THE MPLA

"Medical professional liability" actions are broadly defined in the
MPLA as "liability for damages resulting from the death or injury of a person
for any tort or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or
which should have been rendered, by a health care provider or health care facility to a patient."A The West Virginia Legislature 5 enacted the MPLA in three
stages, passing the original act in 1986, with an amendment in 20016 and a more
extensive amendment in 2003.' For ease of reference, the 1986 MPLA will be
referred to as "MPLA I," the 2001 amendments as "MPLA II," and the 2003
amendments as "MPLA III." This section will provide a summary of the MPLA
and its amendments, and the next section will discuss MPLA III in more detail.
A.

MPLA I

The first version of the MPLA was passed in 1986 as part of a package
of reforms in response to a perceived crisis in the affordability and availability
of medical malpractice insurance.

mium reductions and refunds); Shirley Svorny, Could Mandatory Caps on Medical Malpractice
Damages Harm Consumers?, CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS, Oct. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=l 3780.
4
1986 W. Va. Acts 793, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-2(d) (LexisNexis 1994).
5
The West Virginia Legislature will be referred to as "Legislature."
6
2001 W. Va. Acts 3162-63, codified at W. VA. CODE Ann. § 55-7B-10 (LexisNexis Supp.
2002).
2003 W. Va. Acts 1484, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-10 (LexisNexis Supp.
2003).
8
See West Virginia Offices of the Insurance Commissioner, Medical Malpractice Report on
Insurers
with
5%
Market
Share,
1-2
(Nov.
2008),
available
at
http://www.wvinsurance.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-OftSY32RxmM%3d&tabid=207&mid=79
8 [hereinafter "2008 IC Report"]. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Robinson v.
CharlestonArea Med Ctr., discussed the need for such reform:
[As set forth in the statement of findings,] ... [t]he overriding concern of the
legislature was to encourage and facilitate the provision of the best health care
services to the citizens of this state. W. Va.Code, 55-7B-1 [1986]. The legislature found that in recent years the cost of professional liability insurance for
health care providers has risen dramatically and that the nature and extent of
coverage concomitantly has diminished, to the detriment of the injured and
health care providers. Id. Therefore, to provide for a comprehensive, integrated resolution, the legislature determined that reforms in three areas must
be enacted together: in (1) the common-law and statutory rights of the citizens
to compensation for injury or death in medical professional liability cases; in
(2) the regulation of rate making and other health care liability insurance industry practices; and in (3) the authority of medical licensing boards to regulate effectively and to discipline health care providers.
414 S.E.2d 877, 881 (W. Va. 1991).
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The MPLA is a definition-based statute. Its applicability is set forth in a
series of definitions.9 "Medical professional liability" means any "liability for
damages resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of
contract based on health care services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider or health care facility to a patient."o West Virginia Code section 55-7B-2(c) defines "[h]ealth care providers" as the following:
[A] person, partnership, corporation, facility or institution licensed by, or certified in, this state or another state, to provide
health care or professional health care services, including, but
not limited to, a physician, osteopathic physician, hospital,
dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, or psychologist, or an
officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and
scope of officer's, employee's or agent's employment.'"
Furthermore, West Virginia Code section 55-7B-2(b) defines "[h]ealth
care facilities" as "any clinic, hospital, nursing home or extended care facility in
and licensed by the state of West Virginia and any state operated institution or
clinic providing health care."' 2
MPLA I codified the longstanding requirement under West Virginia law
that a plaintiff alleging medical negligence must prove the applicable standard
of care and breach thereof causing death or injury, and generally must do so
with qualified expert testimony." MPLA I provided a $1,000,000 limit or "cap"
on noneconomic damages,14 limited joint and several liability," and provided
6
protection for settling defendants against claims from other defendants.' It also
codified the following provisions: a two-year statute of limitations," tolling
doctrines (including the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment), a shortened

9

10

I
12

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-2 (LexisNexis 1994).
§ 55-7B-2(d).

§ 55-7B-2(c).
§ 55-7B-2(b).

"3
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis 1994). See also Short v. Appalachian OH-9, Inc.,
507 S.E.2d 124, 130 (W. Va. 1998) overruled in part by Phillips v. Larry's Drive-In Pharmacy,
647 S.E.2d 920, 929 (W. Va. 2007); Eady v. Lansford, 92 S.W.3d 57 (Ark. 2002); Lutz v. Foran,
427 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 1993). See generally H.H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of expert evidence to
support an actionfor malpractice againsta physician or surgeon, 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).
14
§ 55-7B-8. "Noneconomic loss" is defined in the MPLA as "losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, mental anguish and grief." § 55-7B-2(g).
15
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9(b) (LexisNexis 1994).
16
§ 55-7B-9(c).

17

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-4(a) (LexisNexis 1994)
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statute of limitations for claims by minors,' 8 and a ten-year statute of repose.19
MPLA I also established minimal qualification requirements for expert witnesses,2 0 directives regarding pretrial procedures designed to expedite cases,2 '
and restrictions limiting the use of ad damnun clauses.22 MPLA I applied to
injuries occurringafter June 6, 1986.23
B.

MPLA II

In 2001, the Legislature responded to another crisis in the affordability
and availability of medical malpractice insurance,24 including the exit of St. Paul
Companies, the leading medical professional liability insurer at the time, from
the market, 25 and the failure of PHICO Insurance Company. 26 Governor Bob
18

§ 55-7B-4(b).

§ 55-7B-4(a).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis 1994). A later version of this statute was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as an improper legislative intrusion into the Court's rulemaking power. See Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found., 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).
21 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis 1994) (current version at W. VA. CODE ANN. §
55-7B-6b (LexisNexis 2008)).
22
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-5 (LexisNexis 1994). This principle was recently extended to all
civil actions in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-25 (LexisNexis 2008), which was passed on the heels of
a complaint seeking $10,000,000 for an allergic reaction to cheese on a hamburger.
23
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-10 (LexisNexis 1994).
24
See 2008 IC Report, supra note 8, at 1-2.
25
St. Paul announced the exit on December 12, 2001, although it was already heavily rumored. "Because of heavy losses, the St. Paul Companies will exit the medical malpractice insurance business, ending coverage for 750 hospitals, 42,000 physicians and 73,000 other health care
workers nationwide, the company said yesterday." Milt Freudenheim, St. Paul Cos. Exits Medical
at
available
2001,
13,
Dec.
TIMES,
N.Y.
Insurance,
Malpractice
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/business/st-paul-cos-exits-medical-malpracticeinsurance.html. St. Paul had a market share of 32.5% in 2001 and 13.8% in 2003. See West Virginia Insurance Commission, Medical Malpractice Report on Insurers with 5% Market Share 11
(Nov. 2002), available at bttp://www.wvinsurance.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-V29NPUrru8%3d&tabid=207&mid=798 [hereinafter "2002 IC Report"]; see also Office of the West Virginia Insurance Commission, Medical MalpracticeReport on Insurers with 5% Market Share 24
(Nov. 2004), available at http://www.wvinsurance.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-yMRG n4ReM%3d&tabid=207&mid=798 [hereinafter "2004 IC Report"]. The 2002 Insurance Commission
Report indicated:
As is well known by all, St[.] Paul is withdrawing from the medical malpractice market. It is expected that by March, 2003 St[.l Paul (and ACIC) will no
longer be in the West Virginia malpractice market. St[.] Paul together with
ACIC represented over 39% of the 2001 direct written premium in the state.
Thus, over the course of the current year, nearly 40% of the market will need
to find a new carrier. It is known that BRIM II has been picking up a sizeable
share of this business.
2002 IC Report, supra note 25, at 13. St. Paul's withdrawal was not completed until March 2003.
See id., at 26.
19

20
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Wise, in his 2002 State of the State address, referred retrospectively to the "collapse of the medical malpractice insurance system." 2 7 Though some insurance
was still available to many physicians, particularly specialists, it was considered
too expensive. 2 8 In response, the Legislature enacted House Bill 60129 during a
special legislative session to address specific findings regarding the need for
stable and affordable insurance and the need for the state to assist in providing
it."

House Bill 601, therefore, amended Chapter 29 of the West Virginia
Code to provide a temporary insurance option for physicians through the State's
Board of Risk and Insurance Management ("BRIM"), by expanding existing
insurance coverage, previously available only to state-employed physicians, as
PHICO insured 160 West Virginia physicians. Its failure led to a negotiation among the
Governor, Insurance Commissioner, and Medical Assurance to offer coverage to the company's
doctors left without insurance. "Gov. Bob Wise announced this morning that Medical Assurance
of West Virginia has agreed to renew at least 90 percent of its current policies plus cover 90 percent of those 160 state doctors now insured by troubled Pennsylvania insurer PHICO Insurance
Co." Therese Smith Cox, Doctors get malpractice insurance;[] State negotiates temporaryaction
with medical insurer, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IP2-18950753.html. In Pennsylvania, PHICO insured twenty-six
percent of physicians in 1998, reduced to zero in 2001. See Randall R. Bovbjerg & Anna Barto,
UNDERSTANDING PENNSYLVANIA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 8 (2003), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Medicalliability/vf medical
malpractice_0603.pdf. Before PHICO, West Virginia physicians weathered other insurer insolvencies, including PIE Mutual Insurance Company, which was ordered into rehabilitation in December 1997 under the Ohio Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. The rehabilitation phase
ended March 23, 1998, when PIE was ordered into liquidation. See McManamon v. Ohio Dept. of
Ins., 903 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). See also Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 413 (W.
Va. 2001) (Starcher, J., dissenting) (discussing PIE Mutual). Another carrier, ICA, later purchased
by PIE, was declared insolvent in Texas in 1997. See Devane v. Kennedy, 519 S.E.2d 622, 627
(W. Va. 1999). These insolvencies left many West Virginia physicians without the insurance
coverage they purchased, and subject to much lower limits, $300,000, under the West Virginia
Insurance Guaranty Act. See 1985 W. Va. Acts 1150, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-268(l)(a) (LexisNexis 1988).
27
This problem had repercussions, as hospitals and other health care facilities had difficulty
attracting physicians to either stay in or come to West Virginia. Moreover, the lack of available,
affordable insurance lessened protection for injured patients and physicians who caused injury.
Bob Wise, W. Va. Governor, West Virginia State of the State Address (Jan. 10, 2002), available
at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/speech?contentId=16098.
28
See 2001 W. Va. Acts 3097, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-13P-1 (LexisNexis 2003).
"[T]he retention of physicians practicing in this state is in the public interest and promotes the
general welfare of the people of this state. The Legislature further finds that the promotion of
stable and affordable medical malpractice liability insurance premium rates will induce retention
of physicians practicing in this state." Id.
29
2001 W. Va. Acts 3092.
30
2001 W. Va. Acts 3115-16, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-128-2 (LexisNexis Supp.
2002). "The Legislature finds and declares that there is a need for the state of West Virginia to
assist in making professional liability insurance available for certain necessary health care providers in West Virginia to assure that quality medical care is available for the citizens of the state."
Id. See also infra, note 32.
26
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an option for private physicians unable to obtain coverage in the normal market.3 1 Viewing a longer term solution, the bill also contained provisions to enable the initial financing and formation of a physicians' mutual insurance company. The provision of state insurance for private physicians was a stopgap measure intended to exist until the physicians' mutual insurance company could be

formed.3 2
House Bill 601 also added amendments to the MPLA ("MPLA II"),
which applied to actionsfiled on or after March 1, 2002. MPLA II required
that a person intending to file a medical professional liability action ("claimant")
must generally provide a notice of claim and certificate of merit to each poten34
tial defendant health care provider at least thirty days prior to filing suit. The
health care provider could request mandatory, pre-suit mediation; if requested,
the claimant was permitted to take the health care provider's deposition, either
before or during mediation. 35 MPLA II also increased the number of jurors in
medical professional liability trials from six to twelve (with nine required to
prevail); 3 6 eliminated third party claims under the Unfair Trade Practices Act
against medical professional liability carriers; 3 7 and provided directives requiring mandatory mediation, exchange of medical records,39 management and

House Bill 601 "established through the board of risk and insurance management optional
insurance for health care providers consisting of a preferred professional liability insurance program and a high risk professional liability insurance program." 2001 W. Va. Acts 3121, codified
at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12B-6(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2002). This insurance, known as "BRIM
II," was a stopgap measure until the creation of a physicians' mutual insurance company: "The
Legislature took temporary measures to alleviate the medical liability insurance problem by creating programs to provide coverage through the West Virginia Board of Risk and Insurance Management . . . until the legislative 'mechanism for the formation of a physicians' mutual insurance
company' was actuated. W. VA. CODE § 33-20F-2(b) (2003) (Repl.Vol. 2006)." Zaleski v. W. Va.
Physicians' Mut. Ins. Co., 647 S.E.2d 747, 750-51 (W. Va. 2007).
32
2001 W. Va. Acts 3115-16, codiied at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12B-2 (LexisNexis Supp.
2002).
2001 W. Va. Acts 3162-63, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-10 (LexisNexis Supp.
33
2002).
34
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2002).
35
§§ 55-7B-6(f), (g).
36 As discussed below, the twelve person jury was struck down as unconstitutional. See Syl pt.
3, Louk v. Cormier, 622 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2005).
37
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-5(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2002). The right of the health care
provider to file a first party action against a carrier is preserved, but it cannot be filed until after
the underlying matter is resolved. See § 55-7B-5(c). MPLA II also included tax incentives for
physicians and provisions enabling the financing and structure of a physician's mutual insurance
company. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11 -13P-1, et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).
38
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6b(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2002).
39
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6a (LexisNexis Supp. 2002).
31
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scheduling directives designed to expedite actions, 40 and voluntary summary
jury trials.41
C.

MPLA I

MPLA III was passed on March 8, 2003, as part of House Bill 2122.
Like its predecessors, House Bill 2122 contained tort and regulatory reforms,
including a mechanism for the State to exit from the private medical malpractice
insurance business,42 increased power for medical and osteopathic boards, and
tort reform.
Central to MPLA III was the funding and enabling legislation allowing
the formation of the West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company ("WVMIC").
This legislation responded to the "nationwide crisis in the field of medical liability insurance," causing "physicians in West Virginia [to] find it increasingly
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain medical liability insurance either because
coverage is unavailable or unaffordable." 43 MPLA III created "a mechanism for
the formation of a physicians' mutual insurance company" that provided "(1) [a]
means for physicians to obtain medical liability insurance that is available and
affordable; and (2) [c]ompensation to persons who suffer injuries as a result of
medical professional liability."" Funding was provided by a loan from the West
Virginia Tobacco Settlement Medical Trust Fund for "use as the initial capital
and surplus of the physicians' mutual insurance company." 45 The legislation
also provided for the transfer of the "BRIM II" physicians to the WVMIC 46 and
for the State's exit from the private medical malpractice market.4 7 The West
40

§ 55-7B-6b.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6c (LexisNexis Supp. 2002).
In his State of the State address on January 9, 2003, Governor Bob Wise discussed the need
for reform, including the need to level "the playing field so our doctors have the same protections
as doctors in other states-but still retains fairness for patients who are truly injured by medical
mistakes." Bob Wise, W. Va. Governor, West Virginia State of the State Address (Jan. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/speech?contentld=1 6142.
43
Zaleski v. W. Va. Physicians' Mut. Ins. Co., 647 S.E.2d 747, 750 (W. Va. 2007) (quoting
W. VA. CODE § 33-20F-2(a)(1), (6) (2003) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
4
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-20F-2(b)(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2003).
45
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4-1 lA-2(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). As a factual finding for this
action, the Legislature found "certain dedicated revenues should be preserved in trust for the purpose of stabilizing the state's health related programs and delivery systems." § 4-11 A-2(a). The
Legislature provided for replenishment of the Tobacco Settlement Account from a portion of taxes
received by the Insurance Commissioner from insurance policies for medical liability insurance.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-3-14(a) (LexisNexis 2003). The Legislature further levied an additional
premium tax and provided for certain tax credits for reinsurance. Id. Further, the Legislature
amended provisions related to rate making. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-20B-2 (LexisNexis 2003).
46
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12-5(c)(2)(R) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
47
The legislation provided that after September 1, 2002, if BRIM assigned coverage or transferred insurance obligations, then BRIM "shall not thereafter offer or provide professional liability
41

42
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Virginia Health Care Provider Professional Liability Insurance Availability Act,
previously created in House Bill 601, was amended to enable physicians to purchase the necessary tail coverage to allow a move to the WVMIC.4 Certain tax
credits were created related to the purchase of insurance and tail coverage.
House Bill 2122 also addressed the professional discipline of physicians, providing the West Virginia Boards of Medicine and Osteopathy
("Boards") with power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against physicians
based on information received from medical peer review committees, physicians, podiatrists, hospital administrators, professional societies, and others.o
Both Boards are required to initiate investigations upon notice "that three or
more judgments, or any combination of judgments and settlements resulting in
five or more unfavorable outcomes arising from medical professional liability
have been rendered or made against the physician or podiatrist within a fiveyear period." 5 ' Formal disciplinary procedures against physicians by peer review groups, hospitals, managed care organizations, and others have to be reported to the requisite Board within sixty days. 5 2 Circuit court clerks are also
required to report adverse medical professional liability judgments or criminal
actions against physicians to the Boards.53
House Bill 2122 included MPLA III, which applies to actionsfiled after
July 1, 2003.54 MPLA III relies on legislative findings that the cost of liability
insurance continued to rise dramatically. In turn, the rising cost of liability ininsurance to any health care provider pursuant to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section or
the provisions of article twelve-b [§§ 29-12B-1 et seq.] of this chapter unless the Legislature
adopts a concurrent resolution authorizing the board to reestablish medical insurance programs."
§ 29-12-5(d). "The statutory scheme provided that all medical liability insurance obligations and
risks associated with BRIM policies be transferred to the new company upon its formation." Zaleski, 647 S.E.2d at 751. See 2003 W. Va. Acts 1450-51, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-20F9(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2003).
48
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12B-6(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
49
House Bill 2122 also "provided a tax credit for certain medical malpractice liability insurance premiums and medical malpractice liability tail insurance premiums paid." The Legislature
found:
[T]he retention of physicians practicing in this state is in the public interest
and promotes the general welfare of the people of this state. The Legislature
further finds that the promotion of stable and affordable medical malpractice
liability insurance premium rates and medical malpractice liability tail insurance premium rates will induce retention of physicians practicing in this state.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-13T-1 (LexisNexis 2003).
50
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-14(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). House Bill 2122 also provided
the Boards with the power to initiate suspension or revocation proceedings based on information
received from any person. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-14-12(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
st
§30-3-14(a); see also § 30-14-12a.
52
§ 30-3-14(b).
54

Id.

54

W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 55-7B-1 0(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
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surance resulted in the loss and threatened loss of physicians, creating a competitive disadvantage for attracting and retaining qualified physicians and other
health care providers in West Virginia." Similar legislative findings were made
regarding the cost of insurance for the State's long term health care facilities,
such as nursing homes.16 As a result, the Legislature enacted reforms in the tort
system.
MPLA III contained a number of amendments, including a reduction on
the limitation of noneconomic damages or "caps" from $1,000,000 to $250,000,
an increase on the amount recoverable for more serious cases to $500,000,5 and
a $500,000 single limitation on all damages, both economic and noneconomic,
in "trauma" cases. 58 Further amendments included expedited resolution of cases,5 9 limitations on the use of "loss of chance" theory of causation,60 elimination
of joint and several liability,6 1 collateral source adjustment,62 modifications to
636 on ostensible agency, 64 and limits on actions
expert qualifications," restrictions
against health care providers by third parties/non-patients. 5 MPLA III also
created a patient injury compensation fund "for the purpose of providing fair
and reasonable compensation to claimants in medical malpractice actions for
any portion of economic damages awarded that is uncollectible as a result of ...
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
Id. The Supreme Court relied upon the original legislative findings included in MPLA I in
upholding challenges to the $1,000,000 limitation on noneconomic loss. See Syl. pt. 5, Robinson
v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991). See also Verba v. Ghaphery, 552
S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001).
5
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8(a)-(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). These more serious cases
are for claims involving the following: "(1) [w]rongful death; (2) permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb or loss of a bodily organ system; or (3) permanent physical or
mental functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for himself or herself and perform life sustaining activities." § 55-7B-8(b).
58
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). "Trauma" cases are those in
which the patient's injury or death arises from health care services or assistance that (1) are rendered in good faith, and (2) are necessitated by an "emergency condition" for which the patient
enters a designated trauma center, and include health care services or assistance rendered in good
faith by a licensed EMS agency or an employee of an licensed EMS agency. § 55-7B-9c(a). An
"emergency condition" is defined as "any acute traumatic injury or acute medical condition
which, according to standardized criteria for triage, involves a significant risk of death or the
precipitation of significant complications or disabilities, impairment of bodily functions, or, with
respect to a pregnant woman, a significant risk to the health of the unborn child." W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-7B-2(d) (LexisNexis 2008).
5
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
60
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-3(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
61
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
62
§ 55-7B-9(a).
63
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
5

56

64
65

§ 55-7B-9(g).
§ 55-7B-9(b).
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the operation of the joint and several liability principles and standards, set forth
in [the MPLA]." 66
The following Parts discuss these amendments in more detail, as MPLA
III reflects current law applicable to cases filed after July 1, 2003.
1.

Notice of Claim and Certificate of Merit 6 7

West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6, as originally enacted, required a
claimant to serve a notice of claim and certificate of merit by certified mail on
each health care provider to be joined in the litigation at least thirty days before
filing suit and within the applicable statute of limitations. MPLA III adds the
requirement that the notice of claim include "a list of all health care providers
and health care facilities to whom notices of claim are being sent." 6 8 This
amendment fine-tuned section 55-7B-6, which previously allowed the claimant
to send pre-suit notice to several health care providers without identifying the
other providers being served, creating problems in the investigation and evaluation of cases.
Section 55-7B-6(e) also allows the health care providers, within thirty
days of receipt of the claim, to state a "bona fide defense" to the claim made and
identify its defense counsel. 6 9 This allows the health care provider to notify the
claimant of law or facts that could make the claimant reevaluate whether the
health care provider should be sued. For example, the health care provider may
provide notice to the claimant that the health care provider was misnamed or
never participated in the treatment, or provide medical records or other information rebutting the claim.
As discussed in Section III below, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals issued a number of opinions addressing alleged failures to provide, or
deficiencies in, notices of claim and certificates of merit. In general, these opinions discourage the dismissal of claims where the record suggests the plaintiff
has made some effort to comply with section 55-7B-6.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12D-l(a) (LexisNexis 2004). See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2912C-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). In order to recover from the fund, the plaintiff must show he
"exhausted all reasonable means to recover from all applicable liability insurance an award of
economic damages arising under article seven-b [§§ 55-7B-1 et seq.]." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2912D-3(d) (LexisNexis 2004). The amount paid from the fund cannot exceed $1,000,000 or the
maximum amount of money that could have been collected from all applicable insurance prior to
the creation of the fund. See id.
67
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
68
§ 55-7B-6(b).
69
§ 55-7B-6(e).
66
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Causation: Loss of Chance

As originally enacted, West Virginia Code section 55-7B-3 codified the
necessary elements of proof of standard of care and causation in medical professional liability cases:
(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of
care, skill and learning required or expected of a reasonable,
prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which
the health care provider belongs acting in the same or similar
circumstances; and
(2) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury or death.70
As originally enacted, this provision did not define causation, instead
leaving the concept to common law development.n MPLA III stepped partially
into the breach, codifying and limiting the "loss of chance" doctrine.72
The common law "loss of chance" doctrine allows a patient to recover
damages for a lost "chance" of recovery so long as the health care provider's
negligent conduct was a "substantial factor" in the ultimate injury or death.73 A
typical "loss of chance" case is one in which the plaintiff alleges, for example,
that earlier detection of cancer would have allowed a better chance of cure
and/or recovery. Section 55-7B-3, as amended, provides the following limitation
upon the theory:
If the plaintiff proceeds on the "loss of chance" theory, i.e., that
the health care provider's failure to follow the accepted standard of care deprived the patient of a chance of recovery or increased the risk of harm to the patient which was a substantial
factor in bringing about the ultimate injury to the patient, the
plaintiff must also prove, to a reasonable degree of medical
probability, that following the accepted standard of care would
have resulted in a greater than twenty-five percent chance that

W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-7B-3(a),(b) (LexisNexis 1994). See also Daniel v. CAMC, Inc.,
544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001).
71
See Stewart v. George, 607 S.E.2d 394, 398 (W. Va. 2004).
72
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
7
Thornton v. CAMC, Inc., 305 S.E.2d 316, 324-25 (W. Va. 1983). See also Bellomy v.
United States, 888 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. W. Va. 1995); Rine v. Irisari, 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va.
1992); Pennington v. Bluefield Orthopedics, P.C., 419 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1992); Reager v. Andersen, 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
70
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the patient would have had an improved recovery or would have

survived.] 4
This statute requires the plaintiff to establish that he would have had a
greater than twenty-five percent chance of improved recovery or survival, had
the defendant followed the standard of care. 75 While this provision still maintains the "loss of chance" doctrine, the concept of a "substantial factor" has been
tightened to require a statistical minimum standard of proof.
3.

Expert Requirements and Qualifications

West Virginia Code section 55-7B-7, as originally enacted in 1986,
provided enhanced requirements for the admission of expert testimony, 76 including the requirement that the proffered expert be "engaged or qualified in the
same or substantially similar medical field as the defendant health care provider." 77
In Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found.,78 the Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia held this provision was unconstitutional because it violated the
separation of powers by invading the court's province to dictate the Rules of
Evidence, "the paramount authority for determining whether or not an expert is
qualified to give an opinion." 79
MPLA III removed this provision and added the requirement that the
expert witness must be "engaged or qualified in a medical field in which the
practitioner has experience and/or training in diagnosing or treating injuries or
conditions similar to those of the patient.""0 MPLA III also adds minimum quali-

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-3(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
75
The use of a percentage (twenty-five percent) chance suggests that the expert is required to
establish the probability by use of statistics supported by the medical literature. This statute might
be viewed as the flip side of Yates v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., in which the Court suggested that
the defendant must introduce literature supporting his or her method of treatment before a jury
instruction on "multiple methods of treatment" can be given. 549 S.E.2d 681, 688-89 (W. Va.
2001).
76
The other requirements were that: (1) the opinion is actually held by the expert; (2) the
opinion is offered to a reasonable degree of medical probability; (3) the expert has professional
knowledge and expertise coupled with knowledge of the applicable standard of care to which the
opinion is addressed; and (4) the expert has a current license to practice medicine in a state in the
United States. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis 1994).
n
§ 55-7B-7(e).
7
454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).
9
Id. at Syl. pt. 6 in part.
8o
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7(a)(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). MPLA III retained the original requirements: (1) the opinion is actually held by the expert; (2) the opinion is offered to a
reasonable degree of medical probability; (3) the expert has professional knowledge and expertise
coupled with knowledge of the applicable standard of care to which the opinion is addressed; and
(4) the expert has a current license to practice medicine in a state in the United States (and added
74
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fications designed to ensure that experts are engaged in active clinical practice
or teaching, to create a rebuttable presumption that the expert is qualified.
Section 55-7B-7(b) of MPLA III recognizes the trial court's discretion
in determining whether a witness qualifies as an expert, stating, "Nothing contained in this section may be construed to limit a trial court's discretion to determine the competency or lack of competency of a witness on a ground not
specifically enumerated in this section." 8
As discussed in Section III below, in light of the holding in Mayhorn,
there is a substantial question concerning section 55-7B-7(a).
4.

Noneconomic Damages Limitation

Amended section 55-7B-8 reduces the limit on liability for noneconomic loss from the original $1,000,000 cap to $250,000, in most cases.8 2 Under
section 55-7B-8(a), the maximum amount recoverable for compensatory damages for noneconomic loss "shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars
per occurrence, regardless of the number of plaintiffs or the number of defendants or, in the case of wrongful death, regardless of the number of distributees,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section." 83
Section 55-7B-8(b) provides a higher limitation of $500,000 for each
occurrence where the damages are for wrongful death, permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb or loss of a bodily organ system, or
permanent physical or mental functional injury that permanently prevents the
injured person from being able to independently care for himself or herself and
perform life sustaining activities. 84
Section 55-7B-8(c) provides for the increase of caps, up to fifty percent
of the amounts specified annually, based on the Consumer Price Index.85 The
limits on noneconomic loss apply only to defendants who have medical professional liability insurance in the amount of at least $1,000,000 per occurrence
covering the medical injury that is the subject of the action.86 Finally, section
55-7B-8(e) provides a loophole that allows for the reversion to the $1,000,000
cap, in the event the new limitations are found unconstitutional.8 7 As discussed
the additional requirement that the license has not been revoked or suspended in the past year in
any state). W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
81
§ 55-7B-7(b).
82
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
84
85

86

§ 55-7B-8(a).
§ 55-7B-8(b).
§ 55-7B-8(c).
§ 55-7B-8(d).

§ 55-7B-8(e). The $1,000,000 cap was held constitutional on two occasions. See Verba v.
Gaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001); see also Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414
S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991) (finding the cap applied per occurrence and not per plaintiff; noneconomic awards to injured child and parents therefore reduced to $1,000,000).
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in Section III below, this provision was held constitutional in 2011 in MacDonald v. City Hospital,Inc. 88

5.

Elimination of Joint and Several Liability

West Virginia Code section 55-7B-9 of MPLA III eliminates joint and
several liability. 89 This changes MPLA I, which applied joint and several liability only to those defendants found twenty-five percent or more at fault. 90 As
amended, section 55-7B-9(a) requires the jury to answer special interrogatories
showing the total amount of compensatory damages (separated into economic
and noneconomic loss) and the percentage of fault attributable to each plaintiff
and to each defendant. 91
Section 55-7B-9(c) provides that upon a verdict for the plaintiff, the circuit court must enter judgment of several, but not joint, liability against each
defendant consistent with the percentage of fault determined by the jury or
court. 92
Section 55-7B-9(b) addresses the fault of absent parties, requiring that
the trier of fact "shall consider only the fault of the parties in the litigation at the
time the verdict is rendered and shall not consider the fault of any other person
who has settled a claim with the plaintiff arising out of the same medical injury."9 ' However, upon creation of the Patient Injury Compensation Fund, 94
[O]r of some other mechanism for compensating a plaintiff for
any amount of economic damages awarded by the trier of fact
which the plaintiff has been unable to collect, the trier of fact
shall, in assessing percentages of fault, consider the fault of all
alleged parties, including the fault of any person who has settled

88
89
90

MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9(b) (LexisNexis 1994).

91 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). See Gerver v. Benavides, 530
S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 1999) (refusing to apply noneconomic damages cap to $2,000,000 verdict
where jury instructions and verdict form mixed special and general damages).
92
§ 55-7B-9(c).
9
§ 55-7B-9(b). This language is consistent with current case law holding that the twenty-five
percent rule applies only to those defendants in the case at the time of the verdict. See Rowe v.
Sisters of the Pallottine Missionary Soc'y, 560 S.E.2d 491, 500 (W. Va. 2001).
94
The Patient Injury Compensation Fund was established in 2004 for the purpose of providing
compensation to medical malpractice plaintiffs for any portion of economic damages the plaintiff
is unable to collect as a result of MPLA III's elimination of joint and several liability. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 29-12D-I(a) (LexisNexis 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12C-1 (LexisNexis Supp.
2003).
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a claim with the plaintiff arising out of the same medical in-

jury.95
The prior version of section 55-7B-9 provided protection to defendants
who settled with the plaintiff in "good faith" from cross-claims by other defendants. This language is omitted in MPLA III, which eliminates contribution between defendants. 96 In other words, if each party is limited to the percentage of
the verdict assessed by the jury, the situation remedied by contribution-that a
party who pays more than its share can recoup from other negligent defendants-no longer exists.
A more complex question arises as to how this provision affects, if at
all, the ability of a defendant to implead other negligent parties under Rule 14 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has repeatedly held that a party seeking contribution
from other negligent parties must do so before judgment, 97 and before settlement," it would seem that MPLA III should not limit a defendant's ability to
add other parties to secure a full apportionment of fault. The argument exists,
however, that the elimination of joint and several liability removes the basis for
a contribution claim.
Section 55-7B-9(d) explains how the circuit court should determine the
amount of judgment. 99 First, the circuit court must adjust the verdict for "collateral sources."' 00 Next, the circuit court must reduce the verdict for any preverdict settlement, and then multiply the total amount of damages remaining,
with interest, by the percentage of fault attributed to each defendant.'o' "The
resulting amount of damages, together with any post-judgment interest accrued,
shall be the maximum recoverable against the defendant."' 02
With the establishment of the Patient Injury Compensation Fund, the
circuit court's calculation of the amount of the judgment changes. The circuit
court must first multiply the total amount of damages, with interest, by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and that amount, together with any postjudgment interest accrued, is the maximum recoverable against the defendant.103
§ 55-7B-9(b).

95

In Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prod., Inc., 288 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1982), the Court held
"[t]he doctrine of contribution has its roots in equitable principles. The right to contribution arises
when persons having a common obligation, either in contract or tort, are sued on that obligation
and one party is forced to pay more than his pro tanto share of the obligation." Id at Syl. pt. 4.
97
See Howell v. Luckey, 518 S.E.2d 873, 877 (W. Va. 1999).

96

98
9

o
101
102
103

See Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Parke-Davis, 614 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 2005).
§ 55-7B-9(d).
§ 55-7B-9(a).
§ 55-7B-9(d).

Id.
§ 55-7B-9(e).
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The circuit court must then, before entering final judgment, reduce the total jury
verdict by any amounts received by a plaintiff in settlement of the action.'0 The
provision further provides:
When any defendant's percentage of the verdict exceeds the
remaining amounts due plaintiff after the mandatory reductions,
each defendant shall be liable only for the defendant's pro rata
share of the remainder of the verdict as calculated by the court
from the remaining defendants to the action. The plaintiff's total award may never exceed the jury's verdict less any statutory
or court-ordered reductions. os
6.

Limitation Upon Ostensible Agency

West Virginia section 55-7B-9(g) of MPLA III limits the application of
ostensible or apparent agency theories. Under this statute, a health care provider
cannot be held liable under these theories for a non-employee, provided that the
non-employee has at least $1,000,000 in professional liability insurance coverage.106 This provision responds to the common law expansion of the liability of
hospitals for anesthesiologists and other independent physicians who contract to
provide services,10 7 for emergency room physicians regardless of who employs
them,10 8 and potentially for doctors for whom the hospitals advertise their services. 109 However, under section 55-7B-9(g), the elimination of joint and several
liability is not meant to affect a health care provider from being held responsible
for the fault of any person acting as its agent or servant.1 10

Id.
Id.
06
§ 55-7B-9(g).
107
See Thomas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1987).
1os
See Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).
109
See Glover v. Saint Mary's Hosp., 551 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 2001). See also Syl. Pt. 7, Burless
v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., 601 S.E.2d 85, Syl. pt. 7 (W. Va. 2004) (the court established the test for
determining ostensible agency in a new syllabus point):
For a hospital to be held liable for a physician's negligence under an apparent
agency theory, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the hospital either committed
an act that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the physician in
question was an agent of the hospital, or, by failing to take an action, created a
circumstance that would allow a reasonable person to hold such a belief, and
(2) the plaintiff relied on the apparent agency relationship.
110
§ 55-7B-9(g).
'

105
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Collateral Source

West Virginia Code Section 55-7B-9a(a) of MPLA III changes the application of the collateral source rule in MPLA actions."' This provision allows
the defendant against whom a verdict is rendered to present, after the verdict
and before entry of judgment, evidence of payments the plaintiff received for
the same injury from collateral sources.112
Section 55-7B-9a(b) allows evidence of future payments from collateral
sources if the circuit court determines the following:
(1)There is a preexisting contractual or statutory obligation on
the collateral source to pay the benefits; (2) the benefits, to a
reasonable degree of certainty, will be paid to the plaintiff for
expenses the trier of fact has determined the plaintiff will occur
in the future; and (3) the amount of the future expenses is readily reducible to a sum certain.1 13
The plaintiff is also entitled to put on evidence of the value of payments
or contributions he or she made to secure the right to the benefits paid by the
collateral source.1 14 The new provision requires the circuit court to make the
following findings of fact:
(1) [t]he total amount of damages for economic loss found by
the trier of fact;
(2) [t]he total amount of damages for each category of economic loss found by the trier of fact;
(3) [t]he total amount of allowable collateral source payments
received or to be received by the plaintiff for the medical injury
which was the subject of the verdict in each category of economic loss; and
(4) [t]he total amount of any premiums or contributions paid by
the plaintiff in exchange for the collateral source payments in
each category of economic loss found by the trier of fact. 15

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a (LexisNexis 2003).
113

§ 55-7B-9a(a).
§ 55-7B-9a(b).

114

§ 55-7B-9a(c).

I1s

§ 55-7B-9a(d).

112
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Subsection (e) requires the circuit court to subtract the total premiums
the plaintiff paid in each category of economic loss from the total collateral
source benefits the plaintiff received to arrive at a "net amount of collateral
source payments."' 1 6
Section 55-7B-9a(f) then requires the circuit court to "subtract the net
amount of collateral source payments received or to be received by the plaintiff
in each category of economic loss from the total amount of damages awarded
the plaintiff by the trier of fact for that category of economic loss to arrive at the
adjusted verdict."' 1 7
However, section 55-7B-9a(g)(1) provides that the circuit court shall
not reduce the verdict for collateral source benefits that the plaintiff must pay
back through subrogation, lien, or reimbursement."' Nor can the circuit court
reduce the verdict for "[a]mounts in excess of benefits actually paid or to be
paid on behalf of the plaintiff by a collateral source in a category of economic
loss.""9 Proceeds of individual disability or income replacement insurance paid
entirely by the plaintiff, the assets of the plaintiff or the members of the plaintiff's immediate family, or a settlement between the plaintiff and another tortfeasor also may not be used by the court to reduce economic loss.120
Once the amount of the adjusted verdict is determined, including proper
reduction for collateral sources, the circuit court is directed to enter judgment in
accordance with the provisions of section 55-7B-9.121
8.

Third Party Claims Against Health Care Providers

Third party claims are filed against health care providers by nonpatients alleging injury arising from medical care rendered by the provider to a
patient, who in turn causes injury to the non-patient.122 In Osborne v. United
States,12 3 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held a third party nonpatient may bring a medical professional liability action against a physician
where the patient as the result of the physician's negligence injured a third party.12 4 The facts of Osborne demonstrate this principle. In Osborne, several
members of a family were injured and killed in an automobile accident. 125 The
116

17

§ 55-7B-9a(e).
§ 55-7B-9a(f).

§ 55-7B-9a(g)(1).
§ 55-7B-9a(g)(2).
120
§ 55-7B-9a(g)(3)-(5).
121 § 55-7B-9a(h). Further, for a discussion regarding the determination of the amount ofjudgment to be entered against defendants, see supra Section II.C.5.
122
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9b (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
123
567 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2002).
124 Id. at 685.
125
Id. at 679.
118

119
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offending driver, who was uninsured and incarcerated at the time of trial, was
partly intoxicated as a result of medication prescribed by the defendant physician. 126
In 2003, the Legislature enacted section 55-7B-9b, which limits third
party actions to circumstances where health care services are rendered in "willful and wanton or reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons" 127:
An action may not be maintained against a health care provider
pursuant to this article by or on behalf of a third-party nonpatient for rendering or failing to render health care services to a
patient whose subsequent act is a proximate cause of injury or
death to the third party unless the health care provider rendered
or failed to render health care services in willful and wanton or
reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the personal representative of a deceased patient from maintaining a
wrongful death action on behalf of such patient pursuant to article seven [§§ 55-7-1 et seq.] of this chapter or to prevent a derivative claim for loss of consortium arising from injury or
death to the patient arising from the negligence of a health care
provider within the meaning of this article. 128
9.

Trauma Damage Limitations

Perhaps the most sweeping change in MPLA III is the limitation on
damages for trauma care, as set forth in section 55-7B-9c.12 9 This provision targets treatment of emergency conditions for which a patient is admitted to a designated trauma center. 30 Where the treatment in question meets statutory definitions, the total amount of all civil damages recoverable is limited to $500,000,
exclusive of interest computed from the date of judgment. 131 The trauma limitation applies:
In any action brought under this article for injury to or death of
a patient as a result of health care services or assistance rendered in good faith and necessitated by an emergency condition
for which the patient enters a health care facility designated by
126

127
128

Id.
§ 55-7B-9b.
Id.

130

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9c (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
§ 55-7B-9c(a).

131

Id.

129
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the office of emergency medical services as a trauma center, including health care services or assistance rendered in good faith
by a licensed EMS agency or an employee of an [sic] licensed
EMS agency .... 132
The trauma limitation also applies "to any act or omission of a health
care provider in rendering continued care or assistance in the event that surgery
is required as a result of the emergency condition within a reasonable time after
the patient's condition is stabilized."133 However, the limitation does not apply
to acts or omissions in rendering care or assistance that occur after the patient's
condition is stabilized, and the patient is capable of receiving medical treatment
as a non-emergency patient, or which is unrelated to the original emergency
condition. 3
Section 55-7B-9c(d) creates "a rebuttable presumption that the medical
condition was the result of the original emergency condition and that the limitation on liability provided by [subsection a] applies with respect to that medical
condition":
(1) A physician provides follow-up care to a patient to whom
the physician rendered care of assistance pursuant to subsection
(a) of this section; and (2) a medical condition arises during the
course of the follow-up care that is directly related to the original emergency condition for which care or assistance was rendered pursuant to said subsection .....

Furthermore, under 55-7B-9c(e), if "follow-up care is provided within a
reasonable time after the patient's admission to the designated trauma center,"
then "[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a medical condition which arises
in the course of follow-up care provided by the designated trauma center health
care provider who rendered good faith care or assistance for the original emergency condition is directly related to the original emergency condition."1 3 6
The liability limitation does not apply when the treatment is rendered
"[i]n willful and wanton or reckless disregard of a risk of harm to the patient[,]
or [i]n clear violation of established written protocols for triage and emergency
health care procedures."m'3

132

Id.

3

§ 55-7B-9c(b).

134

§ 55-7B-9c(c).

135

§ 55-7B-9c(d).
§ 55-7B-9c(e).
§ 55-7B-9c(f(1}-(2).

136
137
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Section 55-7B-9c(g) directed the Office of Emergency Medical Services
("OEMS") to develop protocols for triage in emergency health care' that recognize and accept "standards for triage and emergency health care procedures
for treatment of emergency conditions necessitating admission of the patient to a
designated trauma center."1 39
Section 55-7B-9c(h) allows the OEMS to grant provisional trauma center status to a health care facility for a period of up to one year. 14 0 Facilities with
provisional trauma center status are eligible for the limitation on liability.'4 1
However, "[i]f, at the end of the provisional period, the facility has not been
approved by the office of emergency medical services as a designated trauma
center, the facility will no longer be eligible for the limitation on liability."l 4 2
Section 55-7B-9c(i) allows a one-time extension of provisional trauma
center status. 143 The requesting facility must submit a written request for extension with a detailed explanation and plan of action to fulfill the requirements for
a designated trauma center. 144 The extension may last up to six months, after
which, if the facility has not been approved as a designated trauma center, it is
no longer entitled to the limitation on liability.141
Section 55-7B-9c(j) allows the OEMS to revoke the trauma designation
for any facility which no longer meets the requirements. 146 Once the designation
is revoked, the limitation on liability ceases to apply to the facility.14 7 Section
55-7B-9c(k) also contains a legislative finding directing the promulgation of
emergency rules "governing the criteria for designation of a facility as a trauma
center or provisional trauma center and implementation of a statewide trauma/emergency care system."l48
The Supreme Court has yet to interpret the applicability of the trauma
care provisions of MPLA III. For now, the MPLA practitioner must look to the
statute itself for guidance. However, like other provisions of the MPLA, it is
only a matter of time before the trauma care provisions become a source of litigation.

§ 55-7B-9c(g).
Id. In the event such written protocols were not developed, the limitation on liability did not
apply "where health care or assistance is rendered under this section in violation of nationally
recognized standards for triage and emergency health care procedures." § 55-7B-9c(f)(2).
140
§ 55-7B-9c(h).
1s

139

143

Id
Id.
§ 55-7B-9c(i).

'"

Id.

145

Id

146

§ 55-7B-9cj).

147

Id.
§ 55-7B-9c(k).

141
142

148
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III. THE MPLA IN THE COURTS
A.

ConstitutionalIssues

Several MPLA provisions have faced constitutional challenges. Both
the $1,000,000 noneconomic damages "cap" established in MPLA I and the
lower caps in MPLA III have been upheld as constitutional.1 49 The notice of
claim and certificate of merit provision has been challenged on several occasions, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has declined to address the constitutional issues, choosing instead to interpret the statute in a way
as to preserve its constitutionality.' 50 However, the court struck down the expert
qualification provision of MPLA I, "' and the twelve-person jury created in
MPLA II, as violative of its constitutional rulemaking authority. 152 The court
has not yet addressed the constitutionality of the MPLA III expert qualifications.
1.

Twelve-Person Jury Invalidated

The twelve-person jury provision of MPLA 11153 was invalidated by the
court in Louk v. Cormier.5 4 Section 55-7B-6d of MPLA II increased the number of jurors in MPLA actions from six, as in other civil cases, to twelve,155 and
provided for a verdict with nine of twelve jurors. 56 In Louk, after the jury returned a non-unanimous verdict for the defense, the plaintiff petitioned for appeal. 157 The court held that establishing the number of jurors and the requirement of unanimity, is solely within its constitutional rule-making power. 5 8
Thus, section 55-7B-6d was struck down as unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 48 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.1 59
In Louk, the defendant argued the plaintiff was barred from challenging
the constitutionality of section 55-7B-6d on appeal because it was never chalThe MPLA I cap was upheld in Robinson v. CharlestonArea Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W.
Va. 1991), and Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001). The MPLA III cap was upheld
in MacDonaldv. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011).
150
See Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387, 396-407 (W. Va. 2005) (Davis, J., concurring);
see also Davis v. Mound View Health Care, Inc., 640 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 2006).
15
See Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found., 454 S.E.3d 87 (W. Va. 1994); see also supra Section
II.C.3. and infra Section III.A.2.
152
See Syl. pt. 3, Louk v. Cormier, 622 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2005).
153
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6d (LexisNexis 2002 Supp.).
154
See Louk, 622 S.E.2d at 805.
155
§ 55-7B-6d.
156
Id.
157
See Louk, 622 S.E.2d at 791.
149

15

Id.

159

Id. at 801.
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lenged in the circuit court. 160 While acknowledging that generally issues cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal, the court held "[a] constitutional issue that
was not properly preserved at the trial court level may, in the discretion of this
Court, be addressed on appeal when the constitutional issue is the controlling
issue in the resolution of the case."l 6 1
The court then discussed its constitutional rule-making powers at
length:
The Rule-Making Clause of Article VIII, § 3 provides, in relevant part, that the Supreme "[C]ourt shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for
all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process
practice and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of
law." W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3. See also Syl. pt. 1, Bennett v.
Warner, 179 W. Va. 742, 372 S.E.2d 920 (1988) ("Under article
eight, section three of our Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Appeals shall have the power to promulgate rules for all of the
courts of the State related to process, practice, and procedure,
which shall have the force and effect of law."). As a result of
the authority granted to this Court by the Rule-Making Clause,
'a statute governing procedural matters in [civil or] criminal
cases which conflicts with a rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court would be a legislative invasion of the court's rule-making

powers.'162
The court concluded the West Virginia Constitution does not permit the
Legislature to invade its rule-making power.163 Therefore, section 55-7B-6d was
invalid because it conflicted with Rule 48 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure.16 4 The court found the statute's requirement that the judge instruct
the jury on a non-unanimous verdict conflicted with the requirement that a verdict less than unanimous is permissible only with the stipulation of the parties,16 1 thereby stripping litigants of their right to a unanimous verdict under

160

Id at 792.

Id. at Syl. pt. 2 (citing Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha Cnty., 438 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va.
1993)).
162
Id. at 795 (citing State v. Arbaugh, 595 S.E.2d 289, 295 (W. Va. 2004) (Davis, J., dissenting)); see also People v. Hollis, 670 P.2d 441, 442 (Colo. App. 1983); State v. Wallace, 517
S.E.2d 20 (W. Va. 1999); State v. Derr, 451 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1994).
163
Louk, 622 S.E.2d at 801. Justice Davis' opinion contains a detailed analysis of prior cases
regarding separation of powers, including Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found, 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va.
1994), which is discussed in Section lII.A.2. of this Article.
16
Louk, 622 S.E.2d at 801.
165
Id. at 800.
161
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Rule 48.166 Since the promulgation of Rule 48 was squarely within the court's
constitutional sphere of power, the conflicting statute was one that the legislature had no power to enact and was therefore invalid. 67
After striking down the non-unanimous verdict, the court analyzed the
MPLA's non-severability clause,16 8 in which the legislature declared that the
twelve-member jury and the elimination of third party "bad faith" actions were
tied to the remaining provisions of House Bill 601. Thus, the entire Act had to
be declared unconstitutional if either provision was struck down.'6 9 The court
held it would not "blindly" throw out the rest of the Act, finding the clause
merely establishes a rebuttable presumption not binding on the courts.1o
The court held that Louk applies retroactively and reversed a nonunanimous defense verdict in Richmond v. Levin.' 7 1 The court made clear that
both the increase in number of jurors to twelve and the non-unanimous verdict
were legislative acts that violated separation of powers.' 72 Justice Maynard dissented, stating that Louk was wrongly decided and further that plaintiffs waived
the retroactivity argument by not raising it below.' 73 Also dissenting was Justice
Benjamin, who wrote separately to state that the plaintiff waived both the constitutional and retroactivity arguments.174
2.

Expert Qualifications

There is an unanswered question concerning whether section 55-7B-7(a)
as amended in MPLA III, which sets forth specific requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony, is constitutional. As discussed in Section II.C.3.
above, in Mayhorn v. Logan Medical Foundation,'7 5 the Supreme Court of Ap166
167

168

Id.
See id. at 801.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-11 (LexisNexis Supp. 2002).

See Louk, 622 S.E.2d at 805.
Id. at 802. In finding a rebuttable presumption exists, the Court held:
Consequently, we now hold that a non-severability provision contained in a
legislative enactment is construed as merely a presumption that the Legislature intended the entire enactment to be invalid if one of the statutes in the
legislation is found unconstitutional. When a non-severability provision is appended to a legislative enactment and this Court invalidates a statute contained in the enactment, we will apply severability principles of statutory construction to determine whether the non-severability provision will be given
full force and effect.
Id at 803.
171
637 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 2006).
172
See id. at 617. A petition for rehearing in Richmond was denied on September 7, 2006.
'73
Levin, 637 S.E.2d at 618 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
174
Id. (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
1
454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).
169

170
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peals of West Virginia struck down the predecessor statute enacted in MPLA I,
which required that the proffered expert be "engaged or qualified in the same or
substantially similar medical field as the defendant health care provider."1 7 6 The
Mayhorn court found that this provision unconstitutionally violated the state
constitutional separation of powers by invading the court's province to dictate
the rules of evidence, specifically holding:
Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is the paramount authority for determining whether or not an expert is
qualified to give an opinion. Therefore, to the extent that Gilman v. Choi, 185 W.Va. 177, 406 S.E.2d 200 (1990) indicates
that the legislature may by statute determine when an expert is
qualified to state an opinion, it is overruled."7
Mayhorn expressly overruled Gilman v. Choi,'78 a 1990 decision upholding the
expert qualification statute of MPLA I. In Gilman, the court found that because
the statute was "concerned primarily with the competency of expert testimony in
a medical malpractice action," 7 9 it was valid under Rule 601 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence 80 and, therefore, unnecessary to decide whether it
"conflicts with Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence,18 which is
concerned primarily with the relevancy of expert testimony." 8 2
176
177
178

Id. at 93-94 (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 1994)).
Id. at Syl. pt. 6.
406 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1990).

Id. at 201. The court relied on a portion of the statute, which authorized the trial court to
require "the testimony of one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses," (quoting W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 1994)) to conclude that the Legislature's "paramount concern was with the competency of the proffered expert testimony." Id. at 202.
180
Rule 601 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides, "Every person is competent to
be a witness except as otherwise provided for by statute or these rules." W. VA. R. EvID. 601. The
Gilman court interpreted Rule 601 to mean that the court "has elected to defer to the legislature
when it enacts statutes on the competency of witnesses." Id. at 202.
181
Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides, "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." W. VA. R. EvID. 702.
182
Gilman, 406 S.E.2d at 202. Although the Gilman court refused to decide whether section
55-7B-7 (1986) was more restrictive than Rule 702, it went on to note that the following commonlaw principles were applicable under both rules:
First, a medical expert, otherwise qualified, is not barred from testifying merely because he or she is not engaged in practice as a specialist in the field about
which his or her testimony is offered; on the other hand, it is clear that a medical expert may not testify about any medical subject without limitation . ...
Second, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must prove that the defendant specialist failed to meet the standard of care required of physicians in the
same specialty practiced by the defendant; and to qualify a witness as an expert on that standard of care, the party offering the witness must establish that
179
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The Gilman court further concluded that neither section 55-7B-7 (1986)
nor Rule 702 required the proffered expert to be board certified in the same
medical specialty as the particular defendant health care provider.1
As discussed in Section II.C.3., the 2003 amendment removed the requirement that the proffered expert be "engaged or qualified in the same or substantially similar medical field as the defendant health care provider" and added
the requirement that the expert witness be "engaged or qualified in a medical
field in which the practitioner has experience and/or training in diagnosing or
treating injuries or conditions similar to those of the patient."1 8 4 Section 55-7B7(b) of MPLA III also added a provision that "[n]othing contained in this section may be construed to limit a trial court's discretion to determine the competency or lack of competency of a witness on a ground not specifically enumerated in this section."' 8 5
In Daniel v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. 186 and State ex rel.
Weirton Medical Center v. Mazzone, 187 the court, although acknowledging that
the circuit court has the discretion pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure to enter a scheduling order in any action which controls the course of litigation, nevertheless found, with respect to the identification of expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases, that the mandatory status
conference provisions of MPLA I "take precedence over a Rule 16 scheduling
order."' 88 The majority opinions in Daniell89 and Mazzone never addressed
whether the MPLA's mandatory status conference provisions violated the
court's constitutional rule-making power. These opinions therefore suggest that
the witness has more than a casual familiarity with the standard of care and
treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in the defendant's specialty ... . Third, a medical witness may acquire sufficient knowledge to qualify as an expert through practical experience, recent formal training and study
or a combination of these factors.
Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
183
Id. at 203.
184
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7(a)(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). MPLA III retained the original requirements of MPLA I that: (1) the opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (2) the
opinion is offered to a reasonable degree of medical probability; (3) the expert has professional
knowledge and expertise coupled with knowledge of the applicable standard of care to which the
opinion is addressed; and (4) the expert has a current license to practice medicine in any state in
the United States and added the additional requirement that the license has not been revoked or
suspended in the past year in any state. Id. However, as discussed in Section II.C.3., MPLA III
also added minimum qualifications designed to ensure that experts are engaged in active clinical
practice or teaching.
18
§ 55-7B-7(b).
186 544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001).
187
587 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 2002).
188
Id. at 126-27.
189
Justice Davis touched on the issue of whether the provision violated separation of powers in
her concurring opinion in Daniel.544 S.E.2d at 909 n.2 (Davis, J., concurring).
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statutes which don't conflict with the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
will be enforced.
Also of note is the court's opinion in Walker v. Sharma,190 a 2007 decision. In Walker, the circuit court, in concluding that the plaintiff failed to meet
his burden of proof, found that the plaintiffs expert could not testify regarding
the national standard of care, or any deviation therefrom, given that the expert
was unfamiliar with the specific surgical technique used by the defendant. 91
The court held the circuit court committed reversible error "in concluding that
an experienced, board-certified urologist could not testify as to the standard of
care applicable to this case." 1 92 In its analysis, the court quoted section 55-7B7(a) (2003) and referred to it as setting "specific foundational requirements for
the admission of [expert] testimony" in MPLA cases. 193 The court, although
recognizing that "Rule 702 is the paramount authority" for determining expert
qualification,1 94 nonetheless still relied on section 55-7B-7(a) (2003) in determining whether the plaintiffs expert was qualified, stating:
In this case, the trial court had little difficulty in ruling that Dr.
Lewis was qualified to testify as an expert witness on the subject [urological procedures] pursuant to W.Va.Code § 55-7B-7 .
The trial court determined that Dr. Lewis was qualified
.. .
based on the fact that he was a board-certified urologist who
spends more than sixty percent of his professional time in the
active clinical area of urology.196
Walker also cited Gilman as the standard "for determining whether a physician
is qualified to offer testimony on the standard of care," one which requires "a
showing that the physician has 'more than a casual familiarity with the standard
of care and treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in the defendant's specialty."' 97
It may be reasonable to argue, as in Gilman, that section 55-7B-7(a)
(2003) governs the competency of expert witnesses and therefore is an appropriate legislative function that does not improperly invade the court's rule-making
power. As suggested in Daniel and Mazzone, section 55-7B-7(a) (2003) can be
argued as consistent with the West Virginia Rules of Evidence insofar as delineating specific requirements, therefore not violative of the court's rule-making
190

655 S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 2007).

191

See id. at 778-79.

192

Id at 777.

193

Id at 778-79.

194

Id at
Id at
Id. at
Id at

195
196
197

781 (citing Syl. pt. 6, Mayhorn, 454 S.E.2d 87).
779 (internal quotation marks omitted).
781 (internal quotation marks omitted).
779 n.2 (citing Gilman v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200, 204 (W. Va. 1990)).
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power. On the other hand, Mayhorn has not been overruled, and, in Louk v.
Cormier, the court struck down the twelve-person jury of MPLA II, finding that
it violated the court's rule-making power under the Mayhorn analysis. However,
in Walker, the court, although acknowledging Rule 702 as the paramount authority on expert qualification under Mayhorn, referred to and relied on section
55-7B-7(a) (2003) in determining whether a physician was qualified to offer
expert testimony in an MPLA action. There is sure to be litigation to address
this unresolved issue.
3.

Noneconomic Damage Limitations Upheld

Since 1986, West Virginia has limited noneconomic loss in MPLA casFor cases where the injury occurs after 1986, there is a $1,000,000 limitation or "cap" on noneconomic loss. 199 MPLA III reduces the caps for cases filed
after July 1, 2003.200
The $1,000,000 cap in MPLA I was upheld as constitutional in Robinson v. CharlestonArea Medical Center20 1 and Verba v. Ghaphery.2 02 In Robinson, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also held the cap applied to
the aggregated claims of all plaintiffs, ruling the noneconomic award had to be
reduced to $1,000,000 by first reducing the jury awards for the derivative claims
of the injured infant's parents.203
In 2011, the MPLA III cap was upheld as constitutional in MacDonald
v. City Hospital.204 The court held that amended section 55-7B-8 did not render
the statute unconstitutional, stating:
es.' 98

West Virginia Code § 55-7B-8 (2003) (Repl. Vol. 2008), which
provides a $250,000 limit or "cap" on the amount recoverable
for a noneconomic loss in a medical professional liability action
and extends the limitation to $500,000 in cases where the damages are for: (1) wrongful death; (2) permanent and substantial
physical deformity, loss of use of a limb or loss of a bodily organ system; or (3) permanent physical or mental functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being
1986 W. Va. Acts 796.
Id.
200
2003 W. Va. Acts 1373-74.
201
414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
202
552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2000).
203
See 414 S.E.2d at 889-90.
204
715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va 2011). Disclosure: Authors Thomas J. Hurney, Jr., and Jennifer M.
Mankins, Jackson Kelly, PLLC, and Christine S. Vaglienti, Associate Litigation Counsel for
WVU Hospitals, represented City Hospital in the MacDonaldappeal. A federal district court had
previously ruled the cap constitutional. See Wilson v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472
(E.D. Va. 2005).
198

199
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able to independently care for himself or herself and perform
life sustaining activities (both subject to statutorily-mandated
inflationary increases), is constitutional. It does not violate the
state constitutional right to a jury trial, separation of powers,
equal protection, special legislation or the "certain remedy"
205
provisions ....
In MacDonald,plaintiff and his wife sued his physician and the hospital, claiming he contracted rhabdomyolysis, a debilitating neurologic condition,
caused by a combination of medications ordered by the physician while he was
hospitalized.2 () The plaintiffs alleged the physician was negligent in prescribing
and failing to nonitor for side effects, and that the hospital pharmacy negligently failed to intervene by warning the physician about the potential risk for the
disease posed by the medications.207 After trial, a jury rendered a total verdict of
$1,629,000, apportioning liability of seventy percent to the physician and thirty
percent to the hospital.208
Post-trial, the circuit court reduced the noneconomic damages portion of
the verdict to conform to the $500,000 limitation contained in section 55-7B8(b). 20 9 The following table shows the original verdict and the reduction by the
circuit court:

I (ilal

205
206
207
208
209

1'o,19J,100

F

(12 Q,000

Syl. pt. 6, MacDonald,715 S.E.2d 405.
Id. at 411-12.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id.
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The plaintiffs filed post-trial motions, arguing section 55-7B-8 violated
several provisions of the West Virginia Constitution. 2 10 The circuit court denied
the motions, and the plaintiffs appealed.2 11
The plaintiffs challenged section 55-7B-8 on several grounds, arguing
that it violated state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection and
prohibiting special legislation, guaranteeing trial by jury, establishing separation
of powers, and guaranteeing open courts and certain remedy. 212 The plaintiffs
urged the court to abandon precedent and apply strict scrutiny in examining the
legislation 2 13 and argued at length that since there was no real "crisis" for the
legislature to solve in 2003 when it enacted section 55-7B-8, the legislation was
invalid.214
The court began its analysis restating its precedent of deference to the
legislature:
In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment,
courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the
judicial, legislative and executive branches. Every reasonable
construction must be resorted to by the courts in order to sustain
constitutionality, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment in
question. Courts are not concerned with questions relating to
legislative policy. The general powers of the legislature, within
constitutional limits, are almost plenary. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the negation of legislative power must appear beyond reasonable doubt.215
The court found it significant that the caps at issue differed from the
prior $1,000,000 cap because they automatically increased each year to account
2to

Id.

Id. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has five Justices. Before the plaintiffs'
petition for appeal was granted, Justice Thomas McHugh voluntarily recused himself because of
his position on the Board of Trustees of a hospital. He was replaced by Ohio County Circuit Court
Judge Ronald Wilson, who was appointed by the Chief Justice. After the briefing was complete,
the plaintiffs moved to recuse Justice Menis Ketchum, claiming that during his campaign for
election to the court, he made statements that he would not overrule the cap. Justice Ketchum
denied the motion, but reconsidered after his order immediately appeared on an internet blog site,
stating he would not permit the Court to be publicly maligned. Justice Ketchum was replaced by
Jackson County Circuit Judge Thomas Evans. The case was therefore heard by three Supreme
Court of Appeals justices and two circuit court judges.
211

212

Id. at 413-14.

213

Id. at 416, n.15.

214

See id. at 416.
Id. at 412 (citing State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Grainer, 143 S.E.2d 351 (W. Va.
1965)).

215

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 8
604

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114

for inflation.216 Moreover, in order to gain the protection of the cap, a health
care provider must have at least $1,000,000 in insurance coverage.2 17
The plaintiffs argued the caps violated the constitutional right to a jury
trial for two reasons. Relying on Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestle-

hutt,2 18 the plaintiffs argued that the caps generally violated the right to trial by
jury. 2 19 They further argued that by setting limits which would change the verdict, the statute violated the State Constitution's "reexamination" clause, which
states, "No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any case than
according to the rule of court or law." 2 20 Both arguments were rejected. The
court found that Georgia's constitutional provision-which states the right to
jury trial is "inviolate"--was substantially different than West Virginia's. 221
Instead, "the right of jury trials in cases at law is not impacted. Juries always
find facts on a matrix of laws given to them by the legislature and by precedent,
and it can hardly be argued that limitations imposed by law are a usurpation of
the jury function."222 As to the "reexamination" clause, the court, as in prior
cases, held it did not apply to actions of the Legislature.22 3
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute violated the constitutional separation of powers, stating, "[I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitation, establish
statutes of repose, create presumptions, create new causes of action and abolish
old ones, then it also can limit noneconomic damages without violating the separations of powers doctrine."2 24
The court held section 55-7B-8 did not violate the West Virginia Constitution's equal protection and special legislation provisions either. 2 25 The
plaintiffs' primary argument was there "was no factual basis for the Legislature
to conclude that lowering the cap from $1,000,000 to $250,000, or $500,000 in
certain cases, would accomplish the legislative goals of attracting and keeping
physicians in West Virginia and reducing medical malpractice premiums."2 26
After reviewing the factual findings contained in the legislation related to the
problems of unavailability and affordability of liability insurance for health care
providers, the court concluded:
216

Id at 414.
Id.
218
691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
219
MacDonald,715 S.E.2d at 415.
220
Id. at 414 n.10 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13).
221
Id. at 415.
222
Id. (citing Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877, 888 (W. Va.
1991)).
223
See id.
224
Id (citing Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 411 (W. Va. 2001)).
225
Id. at 420-21.
226
Id. at 416.
217
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The Legislature could have rationally believed that decreasing
the cap on noneconomic damages would reduce rising medical
malpractice premiums and, in turn, prevent physicians from
leaving the state thereby increasing the quality of, and access to,
health care for West Virginia residents. While one or more
members of the majority may differ with the legislative reasoning, it is not our perogative to substitute our judgment for that
of the Legislature, so long as the classification is rational and
bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose. Further, even though the cap now contained in W. Va.
Code § 55-7B-8 is significantly less than the original
$1,000,000 amount, we cannot say that it is on its face arbitrary
or capricious. 227
The court cited several other jurisdictions reaching similar conclusions.
The court found no violation of the "certain remedy" guarantee in the West Virginia Constitution, stating:
[T]he impact of the statute at issue is limited to a narrow classthose with noneconomic damages exceeding $250,000. Furthermore, the Legislature has not imposed an absolute bar to recovery of noneconomic damages. Instead, the Legislature has
merely placed a limitation on the amount of recovery in order to
effectuate the purpose of the Act as set forth in W. Va. Code §
55-7B-1. Because the legislative reasons for the amendments to
the Act are valid, there is no violation of the certain remedy
provision and, thus, no merit to the [plaintiffs'] argument. 228
Ohio County Circuit Judge Ronald Wilson, appointed to sit when Justice Thomas McHugh recused himself, filed a dissenting opinion on July 21,
2011, asserting the majority opinion was "counterintuitive" and that "the justices
capitulated to the West Virginia Legislature's political and unconstitutional mistreatment of medical malpractice victims, and by its decision, delivered the
coup de grace to the rights of thousands of West Virginians to be fully compensated for losses caused by the negligence of medical professionals."2 29 Referring
to the MPLA as a political decision by the Legislature,230 Judge Wilson found
the caps affected substantial rights of those injured by medical negligence, and
Id. at 418. The court cited Estate ofMcCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944 (11 th Cir. 2011);
Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1053-55 (Alaska 2002); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657
N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. App. 2002); and Juddv. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 140 (Utah 2004). For the
same reasons, the court rejected the "special legislation" argument.
228
Id. at 420.
229
Id at 425 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
230
Id
227
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concluded they violated all of the constitutional provisions asserted by the plaintiffs. 2 31 A petition for rehearing was denied by the court on September 8, 2011.
B.

Applicability of the MPLA

Whether the MPLA applies to a given case or claim has been an area of
active and ongoing litigation. Plaintiffs' counsel, attempting to avoid the
MPLA's restrictions, particularly the lower noneconomic damages "caps" of
MPLA III, have actively litigated the MPLA's applicability on several fronts,
many involving notice of claim and certificate of merit issues.
Applicability was first at issue in Boggs v. Camden-Clark Memorial
232
where the single syllabus point states:
Hospital Corporation,
The West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act,

...

ap-

plies only to claims resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health
care provider or health care facility to a patient. It does not apply to other claims that may be contemporaneous to or related
233
to the alleged act of medicalprofessionalliability.
Boggs was a procedurally complex case in which the issue before the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was whether the claims of the
plaintiffs, who failed to properly comply with the notice of claim and certificate
See id. at 426-30.
609 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 2004). Disclosure: Author Thomas J. Humey, Jr. represented amicus curiae Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia in Boggs.
233
Id. at Syl. pt. 3 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In the text of the opinion, the court
commented:
Fraud, spoliation of evidence, or negligent hiring are no more related to "medical professional liability" or "health care services" than battery, larceny, or
libel. There is simply no way to apply the MPLA to such claims. The Legislature has granted special protection to medical professionals, while they are
acting as such. This protection does not extend to intentional torts or acts outside the scope of "health care services." If for some reason a doctor or nurse
intentionally assaulted a patient, stole their possessions, or defamed them,
such actions would not require application of the MPLA any more than if the
doctor or nurse committed such acts outside of the health care context. Moreover, application of the MPLA to non-medical malpractice claims would be a
logistical impossibility. No reputable physician would sign a certificate of merit for a claim of fraud or larceny or battery; how could such a certificate be
helpful or meaningful?
Thus we find that the lower court erred in dismissing the appellant's causes of
actions in that they were only contemporaneous or related to the alleged act of
medical professional liability.
231
232

Id. at 923-24.
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of merit statute, were governed by MPLA III, particularly its lower noneconomic damages limitation, or MPLA 11.234
In Boggs, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint prior to the effective
date of MPLA 111,235 but did not serve a notice of claim and certificate of merit
at least thirty days before the filing. The circuit court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss.236 Reversing, the Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that
under Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the circuit court
should have allowed the plaintiffs to "amend" their untimely filing, meaning the
case would be governed under MPLA II, particularly the $1,000,000 limitation
on noneconomic loss. 237
As to applicability, one issue in Boggs related to whether allegations of
spoliation of evidence contained in the complaint were governed by the
MPLA.238 The Boggs opinion suggested that claims such as battery, fraud, and
spoliation of evidence were not subject to the MPLA.2 3 9 This language was
modified in Gray v. Mena:24 0
In reviewing the rationale utilized in Boggs, we note an inconsistency and seek to remedy that inconsistency in the present
opinion. In Boggs . . . this Court stated that the Act's protection
does not extend to intentional torts; yet the Act itself states that
it applies to "any tort," thus encompassing intentional torts. See
West Virginia Code

§ 55-7B-2(i). . . . Having examined this

matter in the context of the present case, we clarify Boggs by
recognizing that the West Virginia Legislature's definition of
medical professional liability, found in West Virginia Code
§ 55-7B-2(i), includes liability for damages resulting from the
death or injury of a person for any tort based upon health care
services rendered or which should have been rendered. To the
extent that Boggs suggested otherwise, it is modified.241
Applicability was addressed in Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc., 24 2 a putative class action by patients claiming infections arising from inadequately steri234
235

236
237
238

See id. at 920-21.
Id at 920.
Id at 921.
See id at 923.
Id

239

Id.
625 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 2005).
241
Id. at 330-31 (footnotes omitted).
242
656 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 2007). Blankenship was originally removed to federal court by the
pharmaceutical manufacturer Ethicon after the hospitals filed motions to dismiss for noncompliance with section 55-7-6(b). Id. at 454 n.7. The manufacturer asserted the hospitals were
fraudulently joined in the action. Id. The federal district court remanded the case, finding joinder
240
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lized sutures manufactured by Ethicon. The plaintiffs did not serve pre-suit notice of claims and certificates of merit on the defendant hospitals.243 They argued the MPLA did not apply because they were making product liability
claims against the hospitals, which were merely distributors of the sutures.
Thus, the hospitals' actions were not "health care" subject to the protection of
the MPLA.244 The circuit court dismissed the action for plaintiffs' failure to file
notices of claim and certificates of merit.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the MPLA
applied, stating the following: "[t]he implantation of sutures is a classic example
of health care. Sutures, by their very nature, are implanted during the course of
and in furtherance of medical treatment, i.e., surgery or wound repair." 2 45 The
Blankenship court issued two new syllabus points:
4. The failure to plead a claim as governed by the Medical
Professional Liability Act, W. Va. Code § 55-7B-1, et seq.,
does not preclude application of the Act. Where the alleged tortious acts or omissions are committed by a health care provider
within the context of the rendering of "health care" as defined
by W. Va. Code § 55-7B-2(e) (2006) (Supp. 2007), the Act applies regardless of how the claims have been pled.
5. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-7B-2(e) (2006) (Supp. 2007),
"health care" is defined as "any act or treatment performed or
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished,
by any health care provider for, to or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement." 2 4 6

was not fraudulent because it was "possible" the plaintiffs' claims were viable outside the MPLA
under West Virginia law. Id. A case similar to Blankenship was Redden v. Purdue Pharm., L.P.,
No. 5:03-2222, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27172 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 24, 2003), decided by the late
Judge Charles Haden. In Redden, the court found plaintiffs were required to comply with the prefiling requirements of Section 55-7B-6(a). Id. at *13. The plaintiffs acknowledged noncompliance, but argued the claim against the physician and the clinic was "not a Medical Professional
Liability action, but instead a civil conspiracy." Id. The court rejected this argument because the
definition of "medical professional liability" includes any liability for damages for "any tort or
breach of contract based on health care services rendered." Id. The court also found that a civil
conspiracy, or "combination to commit a tort," is not an independent claim, but is created "by the
wrongful acts done by the defendants to the plaintiff." Id. at *14 (citing Kessel v. Leavitt, 511
S.E.2d 720, 753-54 (W. Va. 1998)). Disclosure: Author Thomas J. Humey, Jr. was counsel for
Thomas Memorial Hospital in Blankenship.
243
Blankenship, 656 S.E.2d at 453.
244
Id
245
Id at 458.
246
Id. at Syl. pt. 4-5.
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However, as in Gray v. Mena 24 7 and Davis v. Mound View Health
Care, Inc.,248 the court reversed the dismissal and remanded the action, with
directions that plaintiffs be given reasonable time to comply with section 55-7B6.249
Applicability was squarely at issue in Phillips v. Larry's Drive-In

Pharmacy, 250 which addressed a certified question from the circuit court as to
whether the MPLA applied to actions against pharmacies. The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia held, "A pharmacy is not a 'health care provider' as
defined by the Legislature in W.Va. Code, 55-7B-2(c) [1986].",251 The court
looked to the plain meaning of the MPLA and its definitions and concluded that
"because certain medical professionals are specifically included under the
MPLA, but pharmacies are not included, [this] means that the Legislature intended to exclude pharmacies."2 52
Phillips also contained a significant new syllabus point, which states:
"Where there is any doubt about the meaning or intent of a statute in derogation
of the common law, the statute is to be interpreted in the manner that makes the
least rather than the most change in the common law." 2 53 The court questioned
its prior opinion in Short v. Appalachian OH-9, Inc.,2 54 which held the MPLA
applied to the actions of emergency medical technicians even though they were
not specifically listed in its definition:
Further, the holding in Short v. Appalachian OH-9, Inc., is of

dubious value because there is no mention of the rule of construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
given a narrow, not expansive and liberal, interpretation. And
finally, while Short v. Appalachian OH-9 gave W Va. Code, 557B-2(c) an expansive interpretation, the Legislature supported
that interpretation when it amended the statute in 2003 to specifically place emergency medical services authorities and
agencies under the umbrella of the MPLA.2 55

625 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 2005)
640 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 2006). Disclosure: Author Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. appeared as counsel for amicus, West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company.
249
See Gray, 625 S.E.2d at 322; Davis, 640 S.E.2d at 96.
250
647 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 2007).
251
Id. at 929.
247

248

252

Id.

Id. at Syl. pt. 5.
507 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1998).
255
Phillips, 647 S.E.2d at 929. An interesting point in Phillips was the court's rejection of the
plaintiff's use of affidavit evidence from former legislators in support of their interpretation of the
statute. Id. at 925-26. In his separate opinion, Justice Maynard concurred but stated he would
253

254
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Applicability was raised yet again in Riggs v. West Virginia University

Hospitals, Inc., 25 6 this time to challenge the reduction of a $10,000,000 noneconomic damage award. In Riggs, the plaintiff developed a severe knee infection
after surgery, which she alleged was caused by the hospital's negligence in administering its infection control program.257 She settled with the defendant
surgeon and proceeded to trial against the hospital, obtaining a $10,000,000
verdict in noneconomic damages for pain and suffering. 258 On post-trial motion,
the circuit court applied the noneconomic cap in section 55-7B-8 (1986) and
reduced the award to $1,000,000.259
On appeal, plaintiff argued the MPLA did not apply to the claim against
the hospital because it was related not to direct patient care, but to general negligence, i.e., the duty to take reasonable measures to prevent infections.260
Plaintiff argued the hospital, through a pre-trial stipulation related to the settlements of two defendant physicians, waived any argument that the actions of its
infection control committee were "health care;" therefore, the verdict was not
subject to the MPLA cap.2 6' In opposition, the hospital and several amici, argued that infection control was indeed "health care" subject to the MPLA.
The hospital argued the plaintiffs were estopped from changing their position
post-verdict about whether the claim was one of "medical negligence."2 63
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the reduction
of the verdict to $1,000,000: "Finding that Appellants may not change the
theory of their case after the return of jury's verdict so as to avoid application of
the MPLA's noneconomic damages cap, we affirm the trial court's application of
W. Va. Code § 55-7B-8 to the jury verdict rendered herein."2 64
The court reviewed the plaintiff s complaint, pre-trial memorandum and
discovery responses, including expert disclosures, in detail and found all centered upon claims the hospital failed to meet the applicable standard of care "in
monitoring the infectious disease control procedures within the hospital and
perhaps in some other ways that they were guilty of medical negligence."265
"Medical negligence" also permeated the jury instructions and plaintiffs counhave allowed consideration of the affidavits from the legislators involved in the passage of the
bill. Id. at 929 (Maynard, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
256
656 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 2007). Disclosure: Author Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. appeared as counsel for amicus, West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company.
257
Id. at 93.
258
Id at 97.
259
Id. at 103.
260

See id. at 104.

261

Id. at 92.

262

See id. at 103. Disclosure: Author Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. was counsel to amicus.
See id at 96.

263
264

265

Id. at 93.
Id. at 95.
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sel's closing argument.2 66 The court found it was only after the circuit court
entered an order reducing the verdict that plaintiff began to assert the MPLA did
not apply.267 The court thus rejected the plaintiffs argument under the doctrine
of judicial estoppel, stating:
Judicial estoppel bars a party from re-litigating an issue when:
(1) the party assumed a position on the issue that is clearly inconsistent with a position taken in a previous case, or with a position taken earlier in the same case; (2) the positions were taken in proceedings involving the same adverse party; (3) the party taking the inconsistent positions received some benefit from
his/her original position; and (4) the original position misled the
adverse party so that allowing the estopped party to change
his/her position would injuriously affect the adverse party and
the integrity of the judicial process.26 8
Applying these elements, the court found plaintiff s post-verdict change
of position was barred. 2 69 As to the first factor, the court found, "Appellants
pled, prosecuted, tried and argued their claims as falling within the MPLA, including continual references to WVUH as a health care provider, breaches of the
applicable standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical probability and
characterizations of the action as a medical professional liability action." 27 0 The
court concluded, "Appellants did not assume the position that their claims were
not governed by the MPLA until after a verdict in excess of the MPLA's noneconomic damages cap was rendered and their verdict was reduced by order of
the trial court." 27 1
The court found the second and third factors were "easily satisfied," the
second because the positions changed in the same litigation,272 and the third
because:
By characterizing their claims as medical negligence claims, the
Appellants were able to attempt to invoke strong emotional responses and a sense of authority from the jury in their closing arguments. In their rebuttal closing arguments, Appellants strongly encouraged the jury to "send a message that you must pro266
267
268

Id. at 95-97.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 100 (quoting W. Va. Dep't of Transp., Div. of Highways v. Robertson, 618 S.E.2d

506 (W. Va. 2005)).
269
270
271
272

Id
Id.
Id
Id.
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* vide medical services in this town responsibly ... changes will
occur . . . health care will be improved . . . you decide what a
reasonably prudent health care provider should do . . . you say
what the community standard . . . will be." Additionally, if the

adverse position is accepted, Appellants will receive an additional $9,000,000 in noneconomic damages. 27 3
As to the final factor, "[b]y not characterizing their claims as premises
liability claims until after the jury verdict was rendered, Appellants precluded
WVUH from developing a theory of defense on this theory." 27 4 Thus, the court
refused to "sanction a change in liability theories post-verdict to avoid application of clear statutory provisions. The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies to
preclude Appellants' arguments that the MPLA does not apply to the jury ver27 5
dict rendered herein."
Two Justices, Albright and Starcher, dissented. Justice Albright asserted that the circuit court should have relied on West Virginia Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b) to allow plaintiffs to amend their pleadings based on the evidence at trial.276 Justice Starcher criticized the majority for being legally and
factually "wrong," and would have upheld the jury's verdict. 27 7
Justice Davis penned a lengthy concurring opinion supporting the holding that plaintiffs were judicially estopped from arguing the MPLA did not apply to their claims of negligent infection control by WVUH.27 8 However, Justice
Davis emphasized that the court did not reach the substantive issue of whether
the MPLA actually applied and expressed her view that the MPLA does not
apply to infections caused by the negligence of hospitals. 279 Justice Davis
equated these claims with "premises" liability and not "medical professional
liability" 28 0 and indicated that she would have so held absent the estoppel argument. 81 Justice Davis also discussed in detail why Rule 15 did not apply to allow the post-trial amendment of plaintiffs' pleadings and why it would have
been "judicial activism" to apply it sua sponte.282

273

Id. at 100-01.

274

Id. at 101.

275

Id.
See id. (Albright, J., dissenting).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 109-10 (Davis, J., concurring).
Id at 110.
Id at111.
See id. at 121.
Id. at 113.

276
277
278
279
280
281
282
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Notice of Claim and CertificateofMerit

Section 55-7B-6 of the MPLA requires a claimant to serve a notice of
claim and certificate of merit on any health care provider at least thirty days
before filing suit. 2 83 In West Virginia, as in virtually all states, expert testimony
is generally required to prove breach of the standard of care and causation.284
The notice of claim 28 5 and certificate of merit 2 86 must be timely served within
the applicable statute of limitations. Section 55-7B-6 provides that the health
care provider may respond to the notice of claim and certificate of merit with a
bona fide defense and may request mandatory, pre-suit mediation.28 7 Upon request for mandatory mediation, the claimant is entitled to take the health care
provider's deposition, either before or during mediation.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has issued a series of
opinions interpreting section 55-7B-6 which discourage the dismissal of claims
where the record suggests the plaintiff has made some effort to comply with the
statute, thereby suggesting that the claim is not "frivolous." 288 Section 55-7B-6
has easily been the most frequently litigated issue under MPLA . 289
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis 2006).
Id. See Eady v. Lansford, 92 S.W.3d 57 (Ark. 2002); Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248 (Ga.
1993); and Short v. Appalachian OH-9, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1998). See generally H.H.
Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an Action for MalpracticeAgainst a
Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).
285
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis 2008) ("The notice of claim shall include a
statement of the theory or theories of liability upon which a cause of action may be based ...
together with a screening certificate of merit.").
286
Section 55-7B-6(b) defines the requirements of the certificate of merit, stating:
The screening certificate of merit shall be executed under oath by a health
care provider qualified as an expert under the West Virginia rules of evidence
and shall state with particularity: (1) the expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in issue; (2) the expert's qualifications; (3) the expert's
opinion as to how the applicable standard of care was breached; and (4) the
expert's opinion as to how the breach of the applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death.
283

284

Id.
Id. Other states also provide for mediation after service of the required pre-suit documents.
For example, South Carolina requires service of notice of intent and expert affidavit prior to suit.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125(A) (2011). Upon service, the parties are allowed to obtain medical
records and may also, with the court's permission, take depositions, in preparation of participating
in mandatory mediation, which must occur within 120 days of service of the notice of intent. § 1579-125(B)-(C). If the matter is not resolved at mediation, the plaintiff is then allowed to file suit.
§ 15-79-125(E).
288
See Gray v. Mena, 625 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 2005); Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387
(W. Va. 2005); Boggs v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 609 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 2004); State
ex rel. Miller v. Stone, 607 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 2004).
289
See, e.g., Roy v. D'Amato, 629 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 2006); Gray, 625 S.E.2d 326; Hinchman, 618 S.E.2d 387; Boggs, 609 S.E.2d 917; Miller, 607 S.E.2d 485.
287
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State ex rel. Miller v. Stone290 was the first case to reach the court on
this issue. The Court affirmed dismissal because the plaintiff did not comply
with section 55-7B-6. Discussing section 55-7B-6, the court found its language
is not ambiguous:
After careful consideration of the provisions of the statute at issue, we conclude that the Legislature's clear intent in enacting
W. Va. Code § 55-7B-6 was to mandate that a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice claim file his or her certificate of merit at
least 30 days prior to filing his or her medical malpractice action so as to allow health care providers the opportunity to demand pre-litigation mediation.29 1

-

State ex rel. Miller was short-lived in the sense that the next several
opinions from the court interpreted section 55-7B-6 to avoid dismissal of complaints where plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with its provisions. While the
court has clearly discouraged dismissal in these opinions, it has, at the same
time, avoided addressing constitutional challenges to the statute as well.292
In Boggs v. Camden-ClarkMemorial Hospital Corporation,2 93 the circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint 294 as violative of section 55-7B-6
because the plaintiffs sent unsigned certificates of merit to the defendants and
did not wait thirty days to file suit. 2 9 5 On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the
circuit court's failure to allow amendment of the complaint to cure the procedural defect involving the certificate of merit.296 In the alternative, the plaintiffs
asserted that section 55-7B-6 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to address the issue of constitutionality,29 7 but
held the circuit court should have allowed the complaint to be "amended" under
Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.29 8
607 S.E.2d 485 (W.Va. 2004).
Id. at 489.
292
In Hinchman, Justice Davis expressed her strong opinion that section 55-7B-6 is unconstitutional. 618 S.E.2d at 402.
293
609 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 2004).
294
Id. at 920. The plaintiffs filed three suits.
290

291

295

See id. at 921.

296

Id

Id. at 921 n. 5.
Id. at 923. The irony of Boggs is that the plaintiffs were rushing the filing of the complaint
to avoid the application of the lower noneconomic damage caps of MPLA III, and therefore did
not wait thirty days. The court virtually ignored the fact that the plaintiffs had already filed a
complaint which was controlled by the MPLA I caps, but had failed to timely serve it on the defendants, resulting in its dismissal under W. VA. R. Civ. P. 4(k). Moreover, the dismissal of the
plaintiffs complaint did not throw them out of court, but rather subjected them to the provisions
of MPLA III. Indeed, upon dismissal of their second complaint, the Boggs plaintiffs filed a third
complaint, and were, in fact, in discovery at the time the Court issued its opinion. In Hannigan v.
297

298
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The court took a similar stance in Gray v. Mena,299 an action arising
from a suit over an alleged assault during a medical exam. The plaintiff alleged
the assault was intentional and took the position, relying on Boggs, that since
her claims were not governed by the MPLA,3 00 a notice of claim and certificate
of merit were not required.30 1 The circuit court found the action arose from
health care and dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff did not comply
with section 55-7B-6. 302
The court reversed and remanded the action, instructing the circuit court
to allow the plaintiff time to file a notice of claim and certificate of merit, and
further ruling that the statute of limitations had been tolled: 303
We find that the Appellant and her counsel, in good faith, made
a legitimate judgment that this case should be framed as an assault and battery civil action, rather than a medical malpractice
action. The Appellant therefore filed her civil action without
adherence to West Virginia Code § 55-7B-6. In this situation,
the defendants should be permitted to request compliance with
the statutory requirements. The lower court should thereafter
examine the issues raised by the defendants and require the Appellant to comply with the statute. The statute of limitations for
bringing an action under West Virginia Code § 55-7B-6 should
be tolled during this court assessment, and the Appellant should
be provided with an additional thirty days after the court decision to comply with the provisions of the statute.304
Perhaps the most significant interpretation of section 55-7B-6 came in
Hinchman v. Gillette.305 In Hinchman, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia reversed the dismissal of a complaint where the circuit court found the

United States, No. 2:02-1286, (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 7, 2005), Judge John T. Copenhaver explained
Boggs, suggesting, "[T]he amendment authorized by the Supreme Court would reflect interim
compliance with [the pre-filing requirements] and be deemed to relate back to the filing of the
dismissed complaint as if those requirements had been initially met, thereby allowing the action to
proceed under the old cap." Id. at 22-23. Boggs ultimately proceeded to trial against the hospital
(the defendant physicians settled), and the plaintiffs obtained a substantial verdict including punitive damages. See Verdict Form, Bernard Boggs, As Administrator of the Estate of Hilda Boggs,
Civil Action No. 03-C-296 (Cir. Ct. Wood Cnty. W. Va. Mar. 10, 2006).
299
625 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 2005).
300
Id at 332.
301
Id.
302
303
304
305

Id. at 329.
Id. at 332.
Id.
618 S.E.2d 387 (W. Va. 2005).
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certificates of merit did not comply with section 55-7B-6.3 0 6 Impliedly distinguishing State ex rel. Miller, where there was no compliance by the plaintiff
with the statute, the Supreme Court of Appeals created the requirement that a
health care provider who challenges a notice of claim or certificate of merit
must demand, in writing, a more definite statement, and give the plaintiff a reasonable time to respond to this request. 3 0 7 A defendant's failure to do so waives
any later challenge to the sufficiency of the documents via a motion to dismiss. 3 08 The Hinchman court issued five new syllabus points:
2. Under W.Va. Code, 55-7B-6 [2003] the purposes of requiring a pre-suit notice of claim and screening certificate of merit
are (1) to prevent the making and filing of frivolous medical
malpractice claims and lawsuits; and (2) to promote the pre-suit
resolution of non-frivolous medical malpractice claims. The requirement of a pre-suit notice of claim and screening certificate
of merit is not intended to restrict or deny citizens' access to the
courts.
3. Before a defendant in a lawsuit against a health care provider
can challenge the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs pre-suit notice
of claim or screening certificate of merit under W.Va. Code, 557B-6 [2003], the plaintiff must have been given written and
specific notice of, and an opportunity to address and correct, the
alleged defects and insufficiencies.
4. Under W.Va. Code, 55-7B-6 [2003], when a health care provider receives a pre-suit notice of claim and screening certificate of merit that the health care provider believes to be legally
defective or insufficient, the healthcare provider may reply
within thirty days of the receipt of the notice and certificate
with a written request to the claimant for a more definite statement of the notice of claim and screening certificate of merit.
The request for a more definite statement must identify with
particularity each alleged insufficiency or defect in the notice
and certificate and all specific details requested by the defendant. A claimant must be given a reasonable period of time, not
to exceed thirty days, to reply to a health care provider's request
for a more definite statement, and all applicable periods of limitation shall be extended to include such periods of time.

306
307

308

Id.
Id. at 395.
See id.
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5. Under W.Va. Code, 55-7B-6 [2003], the making of a request
for a more definite statement in response to a notice of claim
and screening certificate of merit preserves a party's objections
to the legal sufficiency of the notice and certificate as to all matters specifically set forth in the request; all objections to the notice or certificate's legal sufficiency not specifically set forth in
the request are waived.
6. In determining whether a notice of claim and certificate are
legally sufficient, a reviewing court should apply W.Va. Code,
55-7B-6 [2003] in light of the statutory purposes of preventing
the making and filing of frivolous medical malpractice claims
and lawsuits; and promoting the pre-suit resolution of nonfrivolous medical malpractice claims. Therefore, a principal
consideration before a court reviewing a claim of insufficiency
in a notice or certificate should be whether a party challenging
or defending the sufficiency of a notice and certificate has demonstrated a good faith and reasonable effort to further the statutory purposes.309
The Hinchman waiver applies to defendants who receive notices of
claim and certificates of merit and later assert they are insufficient. 31 0 Not responding, or making a blanket denial, may be considered insufficient and a waiver of the right to challenge a violation of section 55-7B-6 via a motion to dismiss the complaint.311 In a lengthy concurrence, Justice Davis expressed her
view that section 55-7B-6 was unconstitutional.3 12
In Roy v. D'Amato,313 the plaintiff alleged the defendant physician negligently treated her finger injury and filed suit without serving a notice of claim
and certificate of merit. 3 14 On the day suit was filed, the plaintiffs sent a letter to
the defendant, stating that the suit had been filed and that they would obtain a
certificate of merit within sixty days. The plaintiff later served the complaint,
Id. at Syl. pt. 2-6.
310
See id. at 395.
311
See id. A review of the briefs in Hinchman shows the plaintiffs raised various constitutional
issues, including the argument that the pre-filing requirements violate the State constitution's
separation of powers. Brief for Appellant, Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387 (W. Va. 2005)
(No. 31760), 2004 WL 3262447. The Hinchman plaintiffs focused on the Court's constitutional
power to enact Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that Section 55-7B-6 was a legislative infringement of those powers, similar to arguments made in Mayhorn and Louk. See supra Section
III. The Court declined to address the constitutional claims, although Justice Davis would have
addressed the issue. Hinchman, 618 S.E.2d at 396 (Davis, J., concurring).
312
Id
313
629 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 2006).
314 See id. at 754.
31s Id
309
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along with a certificate of merit. " The circuit court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff filed suit before the expiration of
thirty days after the provision of the notice of claim.31 The plaintiff filed a
second complaint, and the defendant moved to dismiss, asserting the statute of
limitations had run. 1 The circuit court denied the motion, but gave defendant
leave to move to dismiss based on the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement.3 19 This motion was granted, based on the circuit
court's finding that the letter enclosing the complaint did not qualify as a notice
of claim. 320 The plaintiff s motion for reconsideration was denied by the circuit
court. 321
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia avoided
plaintiffs constitutional challenge and held the dismissal was erroneous.3 22 Relying on Hinchman, the court stated:
[W]e find that Dr. D'Amato waived any right to object to the
notice of claim after the second complaint was filed. The Roys
were not on notice, pre-suit, of any alleged defects in the notice
of claim and consequently, never had any opportunity to address any insufficiencies with a more definite statement. Dr.
D'Amato never took advantage of the opportunity to request
mediation to further clarify and possibly resolve the Roys'
claims even after the first complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the claims asserted by the Roys were frivolous.323
In Davis v. Mound View Health Care, Inc., 324 the plaintiff filed a complaint on the last day of the statute of limitations without complying with section
55-7B-6, then hired new counsel, who filed an amended complaint (near the end
of the 120-day service period) 325 with a letter advising of their intent to serve a
certificate of merit within sixty days.326 Ultimately, the circuit court dismissed
the action due to plaintiffs noncompliance with section 55-7B-6.327 On appeal,
316
317
318

Id
Id.
Id. at 755.

319

Id.

320

Id
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 757-58.
640 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 2006).
See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
Davis, 640 S.E.2d at 93-94.

321
322
323
324

325
326
327

Id. at 94.
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the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held dismissal was correct given the "plain language" of section 55-7B-6.328 However, because the dismissal
order was silent as to whether it was "with" or "without" prejudice, the court
presumed it was without prejudice. 3 29 Applying section 55-2-18 of the West
Virginia Code, the court found that the plaintiff had a year from the date of its
opinion to comply with section 55-7B-6 and re-file the action.33 o
In Elmore v. Triad Hospitals, Inc., ' the court, reversing dismissal of
the complaint, held that mailing of the notice of claim and certificate of merit,
albeit to the wrong address, complied with section 55-7B-6.332 Elmore was filed
on June 30, 2003, immediately prior to the applicability date for MPLA III,
which enacted the lower noneconomic caps.333 The complaint was filed thirtyone days after plaintiff mailed the notice of claim and certificate of merit to the
defendant physician at Greenbrier Valley Medical Center ("GVMC"), where he
had privileges, and not to the doctor's home or office.334 A GVMC employee
signed the certified return receipt and put the envelope in the doctor's mailbox
at GVMC. 3 Since the doctor did not actually receive the papers until several
days later, he did not have thirty days to respond as provided for by section 557B-6.336 The circuit court dismissed the complaint because it was filed before
the expiration of thirty days after service, as the pre-filing documents were not
properly served upon the physician.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the dismissal
in a per curiam opinion, 3 finding plaintiff "complied with the plain meaning of
the MPLA when he mailed the notification package by certified mail, return
receipt requested, to [the defendant physician's] place of work."339 Focusing on
the policy of section 55-7B-6 to discourage frivolous claims stated in Hinchman, 34 0 the court commented that "a principal consideration before a court
reviewing a claim of insufficiency in a notice or certificate should be whether a
party challenging or defending the sufficiency of a notice and certificate has
328

Id. at 95.

329

Id
id

330

33
332

640 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 2006).
See id at 224.

3
Id. at 219-20. In fact, a la Boggs, 609 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 2004), the plaintiff filed another
suit after July 1, 2003, and before the statute of limitations expired, as a backup in case the first
suit was dismissed. Elmore, 640 S.E.2d at 220 n.6.
334
Elmore, 640 S.E.2d at 219.
335

Id.

336

Id.

337

Id. at 220.
Id. at 219.

338
3
340

Id. at 223.
See 618 S.E.2d at Syl. pt. 6 (regarding frivolous claims).
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demonstrated a good faith and reasonable effort to further the statutory purposes," 34 1and found that "[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest-and Appellee
does not allege-that Appellant's claim is frivolous or that his actions impeded
pre-suit resolution of the claim." 342
As to service, the court stated the following:
It is undisputed that Appellant deposited in the mail the notice
of claim by return-receipt certified mail, thirty-one days before
filing a medical malpractice suit in the circuit court. Absent further legislative prescription by definition of the term 'serve,' including direction about where a health care provider must be
served or similar technicalities regarding perfection of service,
Appellant complied with the plain meaning of the MPLA when
he mailed the notification package by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Appellee's place of work. Furthermore, we
find no reason to penalize Appellant with dismissal of his suit
when the record fails to show that Appellant was not acting in
good faith or otherwise was neglecting to put forth a reasonable
effort to further the statutory purposes.343
Justice Benjamin filed a separate opinion, stating the majority erred in
allowing a person with no express or implied authority to accept service, finding
no support for the proposition that a hospital can accept service for a member of
its medical staff.3" He noted the following:
Simply put, the mere mailing of a notice of claim to a hospital
where a physician provides medical services cannot suffice to
establish service of the notice of claim upon the physician unless the notice is received by a person designated by the physician as having the authority to accept such service on the physician's behalf.345
In Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc.,346 the court again reversed the dismissal
of a complaint. The plaintiffs, arguing the defendant hospitals were "distributors" of defective surgical sutures, did not serve a notice of claim and certificate
of merit prior to filing suit.34 7 Following Hinchman and its progeny, the court
341

342

Id.
Id. at 224.

344

Id. at 223.
Id. at 225 (Benjamin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

345

Id.

346

656 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 2007).
Id. at 453.

343

347
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remanded the case to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to comply with section 557B-6. 348
The pre-filing requirements of section 55-7B-6 have also been considered in several opinions from West Virginia federal district courts. Two Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") cases show a divergence in whether the pre-filing
requirements are substantive or procedural. In Stanley v. United States,3 49 Judge
Keeley, in the Northern District, ruled that the pre-filing requirements were
substantive, and the plaintiffs failure to serve a notice of claim and certificate
of merit required the dismissal of the action. 350 To the contrary, Judge Copenhaver, in the Southern District, ruled that the pre-filing requirements were procedural and therefore did not require the dismissal of a complaint where the
plaintiff did not comply with section 55-7B-6. 3 1' Whether the pre-filing requirements are substantive or procedural remains a split issue between north and
south at this point, although Judge Keeley's opinion in Stanley pre-dates
Boggs. 35 2
Judge Broadwater of the Northern District of West Virginia addressed
the pre-filing requirements in Williams v. Fresenius Medical Care.35 3 In Wiliams, the plaintiffs notified the defendants of their intent to file suit, but did not
serve a certificate of merit.354 When the defendants moved to dismiss, the plaintiffs argued that section 55-7B-6(d) allows a sixty-day "safe harbor" from the
date of receipt of a notice of claim for the plaintiff to submit a certificate of merit.355 In response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiff included
such a notice and thus asserted an additional sixty days within which to provide
a certificate of merit.356
Similar to State ex rel. Miller, Judge Broadwater ruled the plaintiff did
not comply with section 55-7B-6 because a certificate of merit was not provided
at least thirty days before suit was filed. 5 The court rejected the plaintiffs
"safe harbor" argument, concluding the "plaintiff should have provided defendants with a statement of intent to file a certificate of merit within sixty days of

348

Id. at 454.

321 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (N.D. W. Va. 2004).
Id.
351
Hannigan v. United States, Slip. 2:02-1286 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 7, 2005).
352 Of interest in Hannigan is the court's chastisement of the government for waiting until late
in the case to raise the plaintiff's failure to comply with section 55-7B-6. By doing so, the plaintiffs were not advised of the government's position in time to cure the problem by filing a new suit
under the "old" cap. Hannigan suggests that challenges based on the pre-filing requirements
should be raised early in the litigation.
3
No. 3:03CV27, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29757 at *10-11 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 26, 2004).
349

350

354

Id. at *2-4.

3ss

Id. at *6.

356

Id.

357

Id. at *7.
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the date that he advised the defendants he was going to file a claim.""' The
sixty-day "safe harbor"provision:
[A]pplies to situations where claimants have insufficient time to
obtain the screening certificate of merit prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations. Obviously, section 55-7B-6(d) does
not help plaintiff here because there was ample time to file the
screening certificate of merit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The court held that because the plaintiff did not comply with the prefiling requirements, the applicable statute of limitations was not tolled, and the
complaint was therefore dismissed with prejudice.3 60
These cases demonstrate that dismissal for failure to comply with section 55-7B-6 is disfavored as a remedy. Combined with the creation of the prelitigation deficiency notice procedure in Hinchman, the message in all of these
cases appears to reflect the concern of the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia over dismissing actions concerning timing or what is
viewed as procedural technicalities. While Gray suggests Boggs is not as broad
as some plaintiffs are arguing, it continues to appear that the court will favor
dismissal, as in Miller,36 1 only when there is no compliance and no excuse for
lack of compliance. Instead, Hinchman reads section 55-7B-6 as primarily directed at encouraging pre-suit resolution of differences, as opposed to the strong
requirement of expert testimony intended by the Legislature. 36 2 In this regard,
the court places primacy on the optional mediation provided by section 55-7B-6,
elevating it to a requirement which must be requested by the defendant in order
to have a valid objection to the sufficiency of these pre-suit documents, even
with the prospect of aiding or educating the plaintiff.363 This may be best demonstrated by the comment in Roy that nothing in the record suggested the plaintiffs' claims were frivolous.
To date, the court has avoided the constitutional challenges to section
55-7B-6, choosing instead to interpret the statute in such a manner as to preserve it. Justice Davis's separate opinion in Hinchman,365 restated in Davis366

358

Id. at *8.

3

Id. at *8-9.

360

I.a 1 -1

361

See 607 S.E.2d 485, 490 (W. Va. 2004).
Syl. pt. 2, 618 S.E.2d 387, 388 (W. Va. 2005).
See 607 S.E.2d 485, 490 (W. Va. 2004).
629 S.E.2d 751, 758 (W. Va. 2006).
Hinchman, 618 S.E.2d at 396-407.
640 S.E.2d 91, 96 (W. Va. 2006).

362
363

3
365

366
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and Elmore,3 6 7 strongly demonstrates her view that section 55-7B-6 violates the
separation of powers, rulemaking, and certain remedy clauses of the West Virginia Constitution. 3 68 Justice Benjamin opined that section 55-7B-6 is constitutional in Elmore.36 9 Dissenting in Miller,370 Justice Starcher wrote that "[i]t is
well established that this Court has the primary constitutional authority to administer and control the procedural aspects of litigation. See W. Va. Const. Art.
VIII, § 3 .... The new amendments appear to have crossed this constitutional
boundary."
D.

Ostensible Agency

MPLA III limits the assertion of ostensible agency unless the health
care provider who is claimed to be the agent does not have $1,000,000 in insurance coverage. 3 72 While the provisions of section 55-7B-9(g) have not been
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the court has
dealt with ostensible agency.
In Burless v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc.,374 the court dealt with the

ostensible agency of hospitals for physicians outside the emergency room setting. The court held:
For a hospital to be held liable for a physician's negligence under an apparent agency theory, a plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the hospital either committed an act that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the physician in question was an
agent of the hospital, or, by failing to take an action, created a
circumstance that would allow a reasonable person to hold such
a belief, and (2) the plaintiff relied on the apparent agency relationship.375
640 S.E.2d 217, 224-25 (W. Va. 2006).
In Blankenship v. Ethicon, Justice Davis penned the majority opinion with an introductory
footnote restating her opinion on constitutionality. 656 S.E.2d 451, 454 n.2 (W. Va. 2007).
3
See Elmore, 640 S.E.2d at 225-26.
370
607 S.E.2d 485, 491 (Starcher, J., dissenting).
37
Id. (citations omitted).
372
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9(g) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
373
Another issue likely to be litigated is, "What does $1,000,000 in insurance mean?" The
statute is likely intended to reflect the requirement of most hospitals that physicians with staff
privileges maintain $1,000,000 in coverage, meaning that a physician with an active policy with
$1,000,000 limits qualifies. What the statute is not specific about is, for example, what happens if
the physician has other claims which have or may cause the available limits to be less than
$1,000,000. Even if the physician's insurance does not qualify, the statute does not create an
agency relationship. Rather, the plaintiff must prove agency under existing law.
374
601 S.E.2d 85, 88 (W. Va. 2004).
3
Id. at Syl. pt. 7 (emphasis added).
367
368
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Burless is significant because it requires the patient to prove reliance on
some action or inaction by the hospital which created an implied agency relationship.376 Burless expressly incorporates the elements of reasonable belief and
377
reliance not seen in the court's prior opinions on ostensible agency. 3 11
Section 55-7B-9(g) was at issue in Cartwright v. McComas,7 where
the circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant hospital, finding
the plaintiffs ostensible agency claims were barred under the 2003 amendment
to section 55-7B-9, which applies to cases filed after July 1, 2003.379 The plaintiffs appealed the ruling on constitutional and statutory grounds. 38 0 In a confusing opinion, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ignored these arguments and, on its own, applied the "plain error" doctrine to hold the claims
against the hospital related back to the original filing of the complaint, which
preceded the July 1, 2003 effective date of the statute.38 Finding the action
timely filed before the effective date of MPLA III, the court reversed and remanded the action.382
Applicability of Noneconomic Damages Cap

E.

In Gerver v. Benavides, 38 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that to preserve the applicability of the noneconomic damages cap,
the defendant must submit a verdict form or ask for special interrogatories that
clearly separate economic and noneconomic damages.384 Any confusion may
result in the cap not being applied.
A similar issue occurred in Karpacs-Brown v. Murthy, 3 where the
court reversed a circuit court ruling declining to apply the limitation on noneconomic loss to a multi-million dollar damage award ($4,000,000 plus pre- and
post-judgment interest) in an MPLA action.386 The circuit court, citing Gerver,
determined that because there was some testimony that the plaintiff had lost
household services, even though not quantified, the verdict could not be reduced
376

Id.

Id. See Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684, 690-93 (W. Va. 1991); Thomas v. Raleigh
Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222, 225 (W. Va. 1987). In those cases, the requirement of reliance was
presumed, and Burless thus appears to resurrect reliance as an element of proving ostensible agency. See also Glover v. St. Mary's Hosp., 551 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 2001) (issue of fact as to
whether the hospital's advertising rendered it liable for the acts of the defendant surgeon).
378
672 S.E.2d 297, 298 (W.Va. 2008).
379
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
380
Cartwright,672 S.E.2d at 298.
381
Id. at 303.
377

382

Id.

383

385

530 S.E.2d 701, 708 (W. Va. 1999).
Id. at 708.
686 S.E.2d 746, 750-51 (W. Va. 2009).

386

Id. at 757.

384
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because there was no separate line for the jury to award economic loss. 387 The
court reversed on this issue, finding:
[U]nlike in Gerver, there was no evidence presented of economic damages suffered as a result of Dr. Murthy's negligence.
Second, the appellee did not propose any jury instructions on
economic damages. In fact, the subject of economic damages
was not mentioned at all in the discussion by the parties and the
court on jury instructions. Further, the appellee's counsel did
not argue for a finding of economic damages during his closing
argument. Finally, the verdict form does not clearly provide for
a finding of economic damages. Rather, the form simply provides for an amount of damages upon a finding of "Past and future sorrow, mental anguish and solace, loss of companionship,
comfort and guidance, and loss of services, protection, care and
assistance suffered by [each one of Mrs. Karpacs' children]."3 88
Moreover, the court noted:
[I]n light of the absence of evidence of economic damages, the
fact that such damages were not clearly addressed in the jury instructions, and the fact that economic damages were not argued
to the jury, it cannot be concluded that Dr. Murthy was fairly
put on notice that the phrase "loss of services, protection, care
and assistance" permitted the jury to find that there were eco389
nomic damages.
Discussing Miller v. Monongahela Power Co.,390 the court noted the
general rule that the burden is on the defendant to ask for separate lines on the
verdict form, but stated that in light of the absence of evidence of economic
loss, it was "reasonable" that the defendant did not request separation. 39 1 "As a
result, Dr. Murthy should not be penalized in light of the reasonableness of her
action in this regard."3 92 Moreover, because there was no evidence of economic
loss, the court also reversed the circuit court's award of pre- and post-judgment
interest on the entire verdict. 393
387

Id. at 752-53.

388

Id. at 753.

Id.
See 403 S.E.2d 406, Syl. pt. 7 (W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 448 (W. Va. 1999).
3' Karpacs-Brown, 686 S.E.2d at 753-54.
392
Id. at 754.
389
390

393

Id. at 755-56.
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Justice Workman filed a separate opinion, indicating that she would
have affirmed the circuit court ruling allowing a verdict in excess of $4,000,000
to stand. Justice Workman argued that there was sufficient evidence of economic loss and that the defendant had failed to request a separate verdict line.3 94
Riggs v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. affirmed the application of $1,000,000 "cap" of MPLA I to reduce an award from $10,000,000 to
$1,000,000.395 Although Riggs may be viewed primarily as an estoppel or "applicability" case, it is also notable for the affirmation of the application of the
cap to reduce the verdict.
Another issue is whether the MPLA I cap applies as an overall limit on
noneconomic loss regardless of the number of defendants ("per case") or as a
limit applicable to each health care provider ("per defendant"). Judge Goodwin,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, adopted the
latter view in Daniel v. Beaver, concluding the language in MPLA I dictated the
application "per defendant" because the Legislature could have, but did not
make clear, that the cap was an overall limitation.39 6 Judge Goodwin rejected
cases from other states, most notably Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospital,397
in which the Virginia Supreme Court, interpreting similar language, found that
398
Virginia's cap applied per case.
This issue has not reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The MPLA III amendments expressly resolve the issue, so it remains to
be seen whether there will be litigation over the "old" cap.399
F.

Causation

The issue of causation remains very fact and case specific, making it
difficult to draw general conclusions. For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed summary judgment for defendants in Stewart v.
George,400 finding that plaintiffs expert's testimony was sufficient enough to
allow the plaintiff to reach the jury on causation.40 1
In Stewart, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants failed to diagnose and
treat the plaintiffs hyperglycemia, causing him to be more susceptible to the
infection he developed after open heart surgery.40 2 The circuit court granted
394

Id. at 758-59 (Workman, J., dissenting).

656 S.E.2d 91, 101 (W. Va. 2007).
300 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
397
376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
398
Beaver, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
3
Author Thomas J. Hurney has filed motions seeking clarification of the "per case" or "per
defendant" issue, which have been deferred pending the need to decide the issue in the event of a
verdict.
400
607 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 2004).
401
Id. at 398.
402
Id. at 396.
395

396
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summary judgment, ruling that there was no evidence that negligence by the
defendant health care providers proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.4 0
The Supreme Court of Appeals analyzed the expert's testimony and
found that even though the expert could not identify a cause for infection, the
defendant's negligence was "a" cause and therefore sufficient under West Virginia law, commenting that "[t]he uncertainties implicit in this medical record
are prime territories for jury determination." 404 The court stated:
Upon thorough review of Dr. O'Grady's deposition testimony
in the case sub judice, evaluated in a light most favorable to the
Appellants, we find that there is sufficient evidence to potentially create a dispute in the minds of reasonable jurors regarding
whether the Appellees' deviations from the applicable standards
caused injury to the Appellants.405
Stewart, therefore, was remanded back to the circuit court.406
The Supreme Court of Appeals also scrutinized the testimony of the
v. Grieco407 to reverse judgment as a
plaintiffs expert on causation in Sexton
408 The court in Sexton found that expert
matter of law granted to the defendant.
419
testimony need only establish a reasonable inference of causation.
Sexton was a shoulder dystocia case in which the plaintiff claimed the
defendant obstetrician was negligent in failing to perform a cesarian section and
in using too much force to deliver the baby. 410 The baby was born with a severe
nerve injury to the left shoulder.41 1
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case-in-chief, the circuit court
granted judgment as a matter of law, finding the plaintiffs expert failed to establish causation because he did not explicitly testify that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the baby.412 The Supreme Court
of Appeals reversed after a detailed review of the expert's testimony, in light of
403
404
405
406

Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.

613 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va. 2005).
Id. at 87.
409
Id at 84.
410
Id. at 83. Shoulder dystocia occurs during a vaginal delivery when the baby's shoulder
impacts the mother's pelvis, stopping the baby's movement down the birth canal. It presents an
emergency because the physician must get the baby out quickly to avoid an anoxic event. See
generally Elizabeth Baxley & Robert Gobbo, Shoulder Dystocia, 69 Am. FAM. PHYsICIAN 1707
(2004). Shoulder dystocia has been described as "one of the most anxiety-provoking emergencies
encountered by physicians practicing maternity care." Id.
411
Sexton, 613 S.E.2d at 83.
407

408

412

Id.
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plaintiffs concession that no direct question on causation was asked. The court
stated the following:
Medical testimony to be . . . sufficient to warrant a finding by

the jury of the proximate cause of an injury is not required to be
based upon a reasonable certainty that the injury resulted from
the negligence of the defendant. All that is required to render
such testimony . . . sufficient to carry it to the jury is that it
should be of such character as would warrant a reasonable inference by the jury that the injury in question was caused by the
negligent act or conduct of the defendant.413
The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the MPLA, which requires proof that the defendant's breach of the standard of care be "a proximate
cause of the injury or death," modified the common law to require a plain and
unambiguous statement of causation. 4 14 "[W]e find nothing in the language of
W. Va. Code § 55-7B-3, or anywhere else in the [MPLA], which shows a legislative intent to prohibit the proximate cause inference allowed by Pygman."4 15
Instead, the court found the MPLA simply codified the common law of causation, and therefore relied on the "reasonable inference" of causation approved in
Pygman.46
Thus, the court analyzed the trial transcript, which contained the expert's testimony of why he believed the defendant breached the standard of care,
by "pulling too hard," among other things, and found enough mention of potential injury to establish an "inference" of causation. 417

413

Id. at 84 (citing Syl. pt. 1, Pygman v. Helton, 134 S.E.2d 717, 718 (W. Va. 1964)).

414

id.

Id. at 86-87. The authors think the Supreme Court of Appeals is probably right that MPLA I
merely codified existing law of causation. Humey & Aliff, supra note 2, at 424.
416
Id. at 87.
417
Id. at 84. In a footnote, the court cautioned counsel:
415

Justice Cleckley noted in State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W .Va. 208,
216, 470 S.E.2d 162, 170 (1996), that "[t]he rule in West Virginia is that parties must speak clearly in the circuit court, on pain that, if they forget their
lines, they will likely be bound forever to hold their peace." Although we are
reaffirming the holding in Pygman that proximate cause may be established
through inferences, we believe that the better practice would be to ask an expert a direct question as to whether or not an injury was the proximate cause
of medical negligence. This approach would alleviate the protraction of litigation as occurred in the instant case. In fact, during oral argument counsel for
the Sextons admitted that trial counsel forgot his lines in not asking Dr.
O'Leary a direct question on the issue of proximate cause. Fortunately for the
Sextons, Dr. O'Leary provided sufficient testimony to trigger the inference allowed by Pygman.
Id. at 87 n.4.
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To the contrary, in Farley v. Shook, a per curiam opinion, the court
expert was unable to establish a causal link between the negliplaintiffs'
found
gence of the emergency room physician and hospital and the patient's injury.4 18
Because the plaintiffs failed in sustaining their burden of proving causation, the
court found that the grant of summary judgment was "correct." 419 The court
reviewed the requirement of expert testimony in MPLA actions under section
55-7B-7 (1986), finding that the case required expert testimony because it involved "complex matters of diagnosis and treatment that are not within the understanding of lay jurors by resort to common knowledge and experience." 42 0
The court found it significant that the parties entered into an agreed order reflecting the need for expert testimony.42 1
Statute ofLimitations

G.

Dunn v. Rockwell established an omnibus test for determining the discovery rule and application of other tolling doctrines. 422 In an opinion authored
by Justice Ketchum, Dunn overruled Cart v. Marcum,423 finding Gaitherv. City
Hospital,Inc. 42 4 and Cart were in conflict, particularly as to Cart's third syllabus point, which held:
Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action or of the
identity of the wrongdoer does not prevent the running of the
statute of limitations; the "discovery rule" applies only when
there is a strong showing by the plaintiff that some action by the
defendant prevented the plaintiff from knowing of the wrong at
the time of the injury.425
The Dunn court resolved this conflict by holding that the "the 'discovery rule' is
generally applicable to all torts, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition to its

application." 42 6
In Dunn, the Supreme Court of Appeals announced a five-part test,
which "should be applied to determine whether a cause of action is timebarred:" 427
418

629 S.E.2d 739, 745 (W. Va. 2006).

419

Id.

420

Id. at 744-45.

421

Id. at 747.
689 S.E.2d 255 (W. Va. 2009).
423 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1992), overruledby Dunn, 689 S.E.2d at Syl. pt. 1.
487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997).
Cart,423 S.E.2d at 645.
Dunn, 689 S.E.2d at Syl. pt. 2.
Id. at 265.

422
423
424
425
426
427
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First, the court should identify the applicable statute of limitation for each cause of action. Second, the court (or, if material
questions of fact exist, the jury) should identify when the requisite elements of the cause of action occurred. Third, the discovery rule should be applied to determine when the statute of limitation began to run by determining when the plaintiff knew, or
by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of
the elements of a possible cause of action, as set forth in Syllabus Point 4 [of Gaitherv. City Hosp., Inc]. Fourth, if the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule, then determine whether the defendant fraudulently concealed facts that
prevented the plaintiff from discovering or pursuing the cause
of action. Whenever a plaintiff is able to show that the defendant fraudulently concealed facts which prevented the plaintiff
from discovering or pursuing the potential cause of action, the
statute of limitation is tolled. And fifth, the court or the jury
should determine if the statute of limitation period was arrested
by some other tolling doctrine. Only the first step is purely a
question of law; the resolution of steps two through five will
generally involve questions of material fact that will need to be
resolved by the trier of fact.428
Dunn also addressed actions against an employer/principal and held the
statute of limitations begins to run based on the tort committed by the employee/agent:
[T]he doctrine of respondeat superior imposes liability on an
employer for the [tortious] acts of its employees within the
scope of employment, not because the employer is at fault, but
merely as a matter of public policy.

. .

. Because the employer

may only be held liable to the extent that the employee can be
held liable, and only for acts committed by the employee in the
course of his or her employment, the statute of limitation applicable is determined by the [tortious] act of the employee.42 9
The Dunn court also analyzed the plaintiffs' assertion of a civil conspiracy, issuing new syllabus points:
A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by
concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself unlawful, by unlawful
428

Id. at 265 (citation omitted).

429

Id. at 274.
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means. The cause of action is not created by the conspiracy but
by the wrongful acts done by the defendants to the injury of the
plaintiff.430
A civil conspiracy is not a per se, stand-alone cause of action; it
is instead a legal doctrine under which liability for a tort may be
imposed on people who did not actually commit a tort themselves but who shared a common plan for its commission with
the actual perpetrator(s). 43 '
As to the statute of limitations applicable to a civil conspiracy, the court
held that it "is determined by the nature of the underlying conduct on which the
claim for conspiracy is based." 43 2
Perrinev. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. analyzed the Dunn rule in the

4 33
context of a class action for property damage and medical monitoring. The
Supreme Court of Appeals found that the circuit court incorrectly granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of whether the case was timely filed
within the statute of limitations. 434 The court "conditionally affirmed" the jury's
verdict and remanded the case, with directions to the circuit court to conduct a
jury trial on the sole issue of when the plaintiffs possessed the requisite knowledge to trigger the running of the statute of limitations.4 35

If the jury determines that the Plaintiffs did not have the requisite knowledge more than two years prior to filing their cause of
action, then the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, as modified
herein, stands. If, however, the jury determines that the Plaintiffs had the requisite knowledge more than two years prior to
filing their cause of action, then the trial court must set aside the
verdict and render judgment in favor of DuPont.43 6
In Mack-Evans v. Hilltop Healthcare Center, Inc.,4

the court applied

the Dunn test and found the plaintiffs wrongful death claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. 4 3 8 In Mack-Evans, a personal representative of a patient's
estate brought a wrongful death action and personal injury claims against a hos430

Id. at Syl. pt. 8.

431

Id. at Syl. pt. 9.
Id. at Syl. pt. 10.

432
433
434
435
436
437
438

694 S.E.2d 815, 906-07 (W. Va. 2010).
Id. at 852.

Id. at 853.
Id.
700 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2010).
Id. at 327.
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pital responsible for the patient's care. 43 9 The patient had surgery on January 29,
2004, and was immediately visited afterwards by her daughter. After talking
with hospital personnel, the patient's daughter contacted a lawyer within days
"because she believed someone at the Hospital did something wrong in treating
her mother."4 40 The patient died on August 9, 2004, and the statute of limitations ran on August 9, 2006.44' The daughter, as representative of the estate,
mailed a notice of claim to the hospital on August 16, 2006; a certificate of merit on October 12, 2006; and filed a complaint on November 17, 2006.442 The
hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time barred by
the two-year statute of limitations." 3 The daughter argued she "could not have
known that [the Hospital's] negligence caused or contributed to her mother's
death until she was appointed Administrator of her mother's estate on August
20, 2004 [,] and had access to her mother's medical records." 4 " The circuit
court granted summary judgment because it found: (1) the statute of limitations
began to run on the date of the patient's death, August 9, 2004, and expired on
August 9, 2006; (2) the personal representative did not mail the notice of claim
until August 16, 2006; and (3) the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations." 5
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the
circuit court's order, finding the complaint was time barred." 6 Critical to the
court's reasoning was the plaintiffs concession that at the time of her mother's
death, she believed the hospital had done something wrong and "had reasonable
cause to believe that conduct by the Hospital may have caused [the patient]'s
death."" 7
Regarding the personal injury claim, plaintiff contended that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run on the date of the patient's death, but instead
439

Id. at 320.

440

Id.

441
442

Id
Id

443

Id.

44

Id. at 322.
45Id. at

446

321-22.

Id. at 324.

Id. Mack-Evans quoted Legg v. Rashid, 663 S.E.2d 623, 629-30 (W. Va. 2008), as follows:
[W]e explained that 'once a [plaintiff] is aware, or should reasonably have become aware, that medical treatment by a particular party has caused [harm],
th[e] statute begins.' We further recognized that 'in some circumstances causal relationships are so well established that we cannot excuse a plaintiff who
pleads ignorance.' Also, . . . we explained that 'the statute of limitations will
begin to run once the extraordinary result is known to the plaintiff even
though he may not be aware of the precise act of malpractice.' (quoting
Gaitherv. City Hosp., Inc., 199 W. Va. 206, 487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997)).
Mack-Evans, 700 S.E.2d at 324.
44
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began to run when plaintiff was appointed administrator of the patient's estate." The court rejected this argument, finding that the running of the statute
was governed by West Virginia Code section 55-7-8a(c), which provides:
If the injured party dies before having begun any such action
and it is not at the time of his death barred by the applicable statute of limitations . . . , such action may be begun by the per-

sonal representative of the injured party against the wrongdoer .
.

.

. Any such action shall be instituted within the same period

of time that would have been applicable had the injured party
not died.449
Although this statute does not toll the statute of limitations for the purpose of appointing a representative of a decedent's estate, the court found that it
is impacted by the mental disability tolling provisions under West Virginia Code
section 55-2-15, and issued the new syllabus point:
The statute of limitations for a personal injury claim brought
under the authority of W. Va.Code § 55-7-8a(c) (1959)
(Repl.Vol.2008) is tolled during the period of a mental disability as defined by W. Va.Code §
55-2-15 (1923)
(Repl.Vol.2008). In the event the injured person dies before the
mental disability ends, the statute of limitations begins to run on
the date of the injured person's death.450
The court found that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the
personal injury claim on the date of the patient's alleged injury because section
55-2-15 tolled the statute of limitations while the patient was under a mental
disability. 451' The court further noted, "[t]hat mental disability ended when Ms.
Mack died on August 9, 2004. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run
on the date of her death." 45 2 This meant that the two-year statute of limitations
had expired on the personal injury claim before the plaintiff mailed the notice of
claim.453 The court therefore upheld summary judgment to the hospital on the
personal injury claim. 4 54

448

Id. at 325.

449

Id. at 325-26.
Id. at Syl. pt. 5.

450
451

Id. at 327.

452
453

Id.
Id.

454

Id.
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Some "pre-Dunn" cases are worth reading, as they rely upon Gaither.4 5
For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals applied the MPLA's discovery
rule456 in Jones v. Aburahma.4 57 In Jones, the plaintiff had heart surgery on July
24, 1998, and developed a pseudoaneurysm, which subsequently burst and required emergency surgery.4 58 While hospitalized after the successful repair of
the pseudoaneurysm, plaintiff suffered a stroke. 4 59 The plaintiff filed suit on
November 17, 2000.460
Jones summarized the discovery rule, stating that it applies in two cir46 1
the rule applies where "the plaintiff knows of
cumstances. Under Gaither,
existence of an injury, but does not know the injury is a result of any party's
conduct other than his own." 46 2 The second occurs when the individual "does or
should reasonably know of the existence of an injury and its cause."46 3 In this
circumstance, the individual must "make a strong showing of fraudulent concealment, inability to comprehend the injury, or other extreme hardship" to
claim the protection of the discovery rule.464
The Supreme Court of Appeals found the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known of the negligence before October 1, 1998.46' As neither of
plaintiffs experts testified there was malpractice after that date, the court found
the treatments plaintiff received "were not additional acts of malpractice, but
treatment for the alleged medical malpractice that had already occurred." 4 66
Thus, "the statute of limitations began to run at the date of injury-not from the
last date of treatment." 4 67
The plaintiff argued that the defendant's failure to provide medical
records for six months required an extension of the statute of limitations under
the discovery rule. 4 68 The court noted that "[i]n some circumstances, the failure
to timely provide medical records could rise to the level of fraudulent concealment." 4 69 However, the court found that the plaintiff knew she had been injured,

455
456
457
458

459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469

Gaither v. City Hosp., Inc., 487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-4(a) (LexisNexis 1994).
600 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 2004).
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 235.
Id.
487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997).
Jones, 600 S.E.2d at 236 (quoting Gaither,487 S.E.2d at 908).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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suspected the defendants were negligent, and received her medical records with
plenty of time left in the statutory period.470
Merrill v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources
deals with the proper application of the discovery rule. 47 1 Merrill arose from a
suit against the Department of Health and Human Resources ("DHHR") by
children sexually abused by their father, which occurred between 1978 and
1987.472 Suit was filed in 2002, when the two plaintiffs were thirty-three and
thirty-seven years old.473 The complaint alleged that DHHR fraudulently concealed its knowledge of the abuse.4 74
The court applied West Virginia Code section 55-2-15 to find the statute
of limitations ran two years after each plaintiff turned eighteen years old.475
Applying the three Gaither factors, the court found the plaintiffs knew of their
injury (the sexual abuse) since becoming adults.476 The plaintiffs also knew the
identity of the wrongdoer, the DHHR, based on testimony about meetings and
the plaintiffs' knowledge that they "were let down."4 77 The court distinguished
knowledge of legal duties of a wrongdoer from the identity of the wrongdoer.47 8
The court also examined Cart v. Marcum in a separate analysis, consistent with the Gaither/Cartdichotomy, and found no evidence that DHHR prevented the plaintiffs from knowing of their claim.479 Records were not requested
until 2000 and were timely turned over,480 suggesting that silence by a defendant
is not enough.4 8
Goodwin v. Bayer Corporation, a per curiam opinion, affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in an exposure case.482 Goodwin focused on
testimony that established the plaintiff was told by his doctor of breathing problems from paint, and filed for disability more than two years before filing suit:
In the end, consideration of the discovery rule based upon the
unrebuttable record herein leads the Court to agree with the circuit court that the underlying action was filed well over two
years after Goodwin first knew that he suffered a breathing
470

Id.

471

632 S.E.2d 307, 309-10 (W. Va. 2006).
Id. at 310.

472

473
474

475

Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 317.

476

Id. at 313.

477

Id. at 314.
Id. at 313.

478

479

Id. at 318.

480

Id.

481

d.
624 S.E.2d 562, 570 (W. Va. 2005).

482
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problem caused by his use of isocyanate-containing paints.
While it is unclear to us why there was such a significant delay
in the filing of the underlying action, it is clear that the discovery rule was never intended to excuse such a delay, nor will this
Court allow the discovery rule to be modified, manipulated or
expanded to now be used to remedy such a delay. Accordingly,
we agree that Goodwin's complaint was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations."'
In Willey v. Bracken,4 8 4 the court addressed the effect of West Virginia's "borrowing statute," West Virginia Code section 55-2A-2, which states,
"[t]he period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside of this State
shall be either that prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or
by the law of this State, whichever bars the claim." 4 8 5 The statute had been applied in the past to bar cases that were barred by the statute of limitations in
another state.486
In Willey, the plaintiff alleged malpractice by the defendant surgeon
during a surgery performed in Ohio, which resulted in the need for a corrective
surgery performed by another physician in West Virginia. 48 7 The court treated
the second surgery, even though not negligently performed, or done by the defendant, as an additional injury the defendant caused.488 Thus, the court held the
complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations based on the "unique"
facts before it, issuing a new syllabus point:
Id. at 568-69.
Slip Op. No. 35519, 2010 WL 4025599 (W. Va. Oct. 14, 2010).
485
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2A-2 (LexisNexis 2008).
486
For example, in Hayes v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 452 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1994), the court
upheld dismissal of plaintiffs complaint as barred by Kentucky's one year statute of limitation,
stating:
In summary, we hold that W. Va.Code, 55-2A-2 [1959] provides that "[t]he period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside of [West Virginia]
shall be either that prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued
or by the law of [West Virginia], whichever bars the claim." Therefore, under
W. Va.Code, 55-2A-2 [1959], when a person files a personal injury claim in
West Virginia more than one year after the injury occurred in Kentucky, Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, rather than West
Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, is applicable
because the Kentucky period of limitations would bar the claim.
Id. at 462. The court stated, "The spirit of W. Va. Code, 55-2A-2 [1959] clearly favors the
extinguishment of the claim." Id.; see also McKinney v. Fairchild, 487 S.E.2d 913 (W.
Va. 1997) (citing Hayes, 452 S.E.2d at 462) (discussing effect of West Virginia Code
section 55-2A-2, "which 'clearly favors the extinguishment of the claim,"' but finding
West Virginia Code section 55-2-18 [1985], extended the statute of limitations after
dismissal of prior action).
487
Willey, 2010 WL 4025599 at *1-2.
488
Id.at *11.
483
484
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When a cause of action is filed in a West Virginia court seeking
damages for a surgical procedure that was negligently performed in a foreign jurisdiction, along with damages for a subsequent surgicalprocedureperformed in West Virginia as a direct result of the negligence in the foreign jurisdiction,public
policy demands that the applicable West Virginia statute of limitations applies to the negligence committed in the foreign jurisdiction. Under these unique circumstances, the West Virginia
borrowing statute, W. Va. Code § 55-2A-2 (1959) (Repl. Vol.
2008), has no application.489
The court's opinion relied heavily on the Certain Remedy Clause of the
West Virginia Constitution, which states, "[tihe courts of this State shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him, in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."4 90 The court found that the plaintiffs
complaint, which was barred by Ohio's one-year statute of limitation, could be
brought in West Virginia because the plaintiff had surgery in West Virginia to
repair the injury from the alleged negligence. Taken to its extreme, Willey invalidates West Virginia Code section 55-2A-2 in cases where the malpractice occurs in another state, but treatment for injuries "as a direct result" of the malpractice occurs in West Virginia, thereby allowing plaintiffs to invoke the longer statute of limitations (assuming there is jurisdiction over the health care provider). Since Willey is limited to its "unique" facts, its effect on other cases is
unknown.
H.

Expert Witnesses

In most circumstances, MPLA plaintiffs are required to prove a breach
of the standard of care and causation through expert testimony. 491 The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia continues to require a minimal demonstration
of qualification, with respect to education and training, and some familiarity

Id. at Syl. pt. 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at *14 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17).
491
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). For a discussion concerning
whether the statute is constitutional, see Section III.A.i. Expert testimony is required in other
cases, such as products liability, where necessary to prove product defect. In Gibson v. Little Gen.
Stores, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 2007), the plaintiff sued for damages sustained when she was
"soaked" with gas from an allegedly "malfunctioning" pump at a convenience store. Id at 10708. Summary judgment, granted when the plaintiff did not support the product defect allegations
with expert testimony or any explanation as to why or how the pump malfunctioned, was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Id. at 110. The court found the plaintiffs "claim that the gasoline pump malfunctioned [was] based solely upon her own unsubstantiated opinion and conclusory speculation." Id.
489

490
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with the issue in question.4 92 The basis for the opinion is largely left as a matter
for cross examination.
In Walker v. Sharma,493 the circuit court excluded plaintiffs expert,
finding he was unfamiliar with the surgical technique employed by the defendant because it was not used where he practiced, and therefore, could not testify
as to the standard of care.494
Walker involved claims against a urologist who perforated the plaintiff's urethra during a cystoscopy that was performed using Bard instruments. 495
At trial, the plaintiff s expert testified the defendant was negligent in the manner
in which he "used the Bard instrument set in attempting to dilate the constricted
area of [the plaintiffs] urethra."4 96 The circuit court granted the defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs expert "was not
familiar with the methods employed for the dilation of urethral strictures at the
hospitals in Huntington, West Virginia or at Duke University or at other hospitals where he does not practice." 497 Thus, the circuit court concluded plaintiffs
expert could not "establish what constituted the national standard of care and
that a deviation from the national standard of care occurred." 4 98
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, finding the circuit court improperly applied the "locality rule" by requiring the expert to be familiar with
practices in Huntington, West Virginia, as opposed to applying a national standard of care. 4 99 "What this case demonstrates is how this Court's decision to
abandon the locality rule in medical malpractice cases in favor of a standard of
care more national in approach is often misemployed to prevent qualified physicians from offering testimony in cases brought under the [MPLA]." 500 The
court's discussion is instructive:
By eliminating the locality rule, courts such as ours clearly
sought to remove the requirement that an expert was not qualified to testify in a medical malpractice case unless he was intimately familiar with local procedures and techniques. In reasonSee Walker v. Sharma, 655 S.E.2d 775, 779 n.2 (W. Va. 2007) (citing Gilman v. Choi, 406
S.E.2d 200, 204 (W. Va. 1990)) (requiring a showing that the physician has 'more than a casual
familiarity' with the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in
the defendant's specialty). See also Fortney v. Al-Hajj, 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992) (experience
in treating type of injuries can satisfy "same or similar field" requirement).
493
655 S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 2007) (also discussed in Section III.A.ii.).
494
Id. at 780.
Id. at 777. The physician performed the cystoscopy to dilate, or open up, the plaintiffs
495
constricted urethra. Id.
496
Id. at 778
492

497
498

499
500

Id. at 779.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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ing that Dr. Lewis' extrajurisdictional [sic] practice prevented
him from being able to testify as to the standard of care that applied in this case, the trial court hinged its decision on the same
rationale which underlies the now-rejected locality rule. The trial court wrongly read into a national standard of care (which is
nothing more than the rejection of the locality rule) a requirement that an expert has to be familiar with each and every procedure and piece of equipment used by local physicians to testify as to the standard of care. Simply put, the adoption of a standard of care that is national in approach does not prevent an
otherwise qualified expert from testifying as to the applicable
standard of care based solely on the fact that the expert employs
a medically accepted but different method of performing the
same type of procedure at issue in a medical malpractice suit.
We certainly appreciate that a given plaintiff might prefer to
have as his expert a physician who is intimately familiar with
the exact method or instrument set at issue in a given medical
malpractice case. That, however, is nothing more than an issue
of how much weight is to be accorded to the expert's testimony;
it does not go to the admissibility of that expert's testimony in
the first place. See Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 527, 466
S.E.2d 171, 186 (1995) (recognizing that "[d]isputes as to the
strength of an expert's credentials, mere differences in the methodology, or lack of textual authority for the opinion go to
weight and not to the admissibility of their testimony") (emphasis supplied).o
The court found plaintiff s expert was appropriately qualified and in fact
offered testimony of the standard of care and the defendant's breach thereof. 502
"Where the trial court went astray in making its ruling was to equate [the expert's] purported lack of familiarity with a particularized instrument system with
lack of knowledge as to the standard of care that applied to the use of that set of
instruments."o 3 Thus, the fact the expert did not use the particular procedure
employed by the defendant did not disqualify him-any unfamiliarity could be
explored through cross examination. Walker contained two new syllabus points:
Following a trial court's decision that a physician is qualified to
offer expert testimony in a given field, issues that arise as to the
physician's personal use of a specific technique or procedure to
which he or she seeks to offer expert testimony go only to the
501
502
503

Id. at 781.
Id. at 782.

Id.
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weight to be attached to that testimony and not to its admissibility.504
Where there are several approved methods of performing a particular medical procedure, the fact that a physician who is qualified to offer an expert opinion based on field of practice and expertise utilizes a different method than the doctor whose actions
are at issue does not prevent the physician from offering testimony on the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice case.505
Implicit in Walker is the suggestion that the issue of an expert's personal practice is a matter for cross examination. In Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic
Group, P.C., the Supreme Court of Georgia, citing Walker and other cases, reversed the trial court's ruling, which prohibited cross examination of plaintiffs
expert regarding his personal practices.506 The court concluded:
Lacking the benefit of knowledge that defendants' own experts
routinely practiced differently from the standard of care to
which they had testified, the jury was compelled to make a determination as to the standard of care based on incomplete and
potentially misleading information. Under these circumstances,
we cannot find the erroneous exclusion of personal practices
testimony to have been harmless.o
Id. at Syl. pt. 3.
Id. at Syl. pt. 4.
506
681 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. 2009).
507
Id. at 156 (citation omitted). Condrareversed Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assocs., 563
S.E.2d 431 (Ga. 2002), relying in part on Walker and cases from other jurisdictions:
Also important in our decision to shift course on this issue is the growing
body of case law from other jurisdictions supportive of the admissibility of
expert personal practices testimony, at least for some purposes. See, e.g.,
Swink v. Weintraub, 672 S.E.2d 53(111) (N.C. Ct.App. 2009) (affirming admission of personal practices testimony); Bergman, supra, 313 Ill.Dec. 862, 873
N.E.2d at 507(II)(B)(2)(d) (affirming admission of personal practices testimony for impeachment purposes); Smethers, supra, 108 P.3d at 956 (reversing
exclusion of personal practices testimony); Gallina v. Watson, 354 Ill.App.3d
515, 290 Il.Dec. 275, 821 N.E.2d 326(II)(A) (2004) (reversing exclusion of
personal practices testimony); Wallbank v. Rothenberg, 74 P.3d 413(I) (Colo.
Ct.App. 2003) (affirming admission of personal practices testimony). See also
Hartel v. Pruett, 998 So.2d 979(I)(E) (Miss. 2008) (no abuse of discretion in
permitting expert personal practices testimony); Walker v. Sharma, 221 W.Va.
559, 655 S.E.2d 775, 782-783 (W. Va.2 007) (where physician qualified as
expert, personal practices as to procedures on which expert opinion offered relevant for purposes of assessing credibility). Though not all jurisdictions have
followed this trend, see, e.g., Vititoe v. Lester E. Cox Med. Centers, 27 S.W.3d
504
505
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Fout-Iser v. Hahn, is another case, like Walker, in which the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia carefully parsed the testimony of plaintiffs
expert and reversed summary judgment granted to defendant.508 In Fout-Iser, a
pregnant woman came to the emergency room of a rural hospital that did not
provide obstetrical services. 509 The emergency room physician ordered an ultrasound, and an inexperienced radiology technologist took some images and sent
them via teleradiology to the radiologist on call.510 Because the films were inadequate, the radiologist, who had died by the time the complaint was filed,
instructed the technologist to try and obtain better studies."' In deposition, the
technologist testified the radiologist was angry and cursing (as prominently featured in the court's opinion). 5 12 When the technologist did not call back within
thirty minutes, the radiologist called and was told the patient was being transferred.' When the patient reached the next hospital, which was an hour away,
the baby had already died.5 14 Prior to trial, the hospital and emergency room
physician settled with the plaintiffs, and the circuit court granted summary
judgment to the radiologist, which plaintiffs appealed. 15
The Supreme Court of Appeals agreed with plaintiffs' argument that the
combined testimony of their experts was enough to create an issue of fact for the
jury, and ignored the fact that no expert testified that a breach of the standard of
care by the radiologist was a cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.516 Justice Davis's
dissent reflects her careful examination of the experts' testimony, as well as her

812(111) (Mo. Ct.App. 2000) (affirming exclusion of personal practices testimony); Carbonnell v. Bluhm, 114 Mich.App. 216, 318 N.W.2d 659(111)
(1982) (same), admissibility of personal practices testimony appears now to
be the prevailing view.
Id. at 155. Condra also relied on the Georgia statute, Official Code of Georgia Annotated section
24-9-67. 1(c)(2)(A), similar to West Virginia Code section 55-7B-7, which set forth requirements
for expert testimony, finding that personal experience was relevant and part of the threshold inquiry into qualification. Condra, 681 S.E.2d at 154. Walker, while allowing this inquiry, was
broader, in that the expert was not required to demonstrate personal experience or knowledge of a
particular technique before being allowed to testify as to a breach of the standard of care. 655
S.E.2d 775, Syl. pt. 3 (W. Va. 2007). Once allowed, the lack of experience is fodder for cross
examination.
508
649 S.E.2d 246, 252 (W. Va. 2007).
509
Id. at 248. Disclosure: Author Thomas J. Humey, Jr., represented the radiologist on appeal.
510

Id.

511

Id

512

Id.

513

Id. at 249.

514

Id

5

Id.

516

Id. at 251.
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concern that the majority relied on testimony by experts who expressly stated
they were not offering expert testimony against the radiologist.
Walker and Fout-Iser demonstrate the court will continue to closely examine expert testimony in MPLA actions and will apply Gilman 's "more than
passing familiarity" standard to qualifications, leaving most issues for cross
examination. 1 This is largely consistent with the court's general approach to
expert testimony, which was illustrated in State ex rel. Jones v. Recht." 9 Jones
addresses generally the exclusion of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence, 52 0 applying the "Daubert" analysis required
by Wilt v. Buracker.2 In Jones, the court reversed the complete exclusion of an
expert who testified as to lack of injury due to low impact as well as neurological injury. 5 22 The court found the circuit court should have examined the testimony; excluded that which was "personal opinion", i.e., opinions on low impact; but admitted that which was within the witness's expertise, i.e., opinions
on neurological injury, even though the separation between the two was difficult. 523

Similarly, in Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., a class action
toxic tort, where the jury awarded approximately $380,000,000 for property
damage and required medical monitoring, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's admission of plaintiffs' experts.524 One plaintiffs expert, Dr. Brown, proffered as "an expert in contaminant assessment, remediation, related fields such as fate and transport, risk assessment and the [sic] fingerprinting contamination" was found qualified by the circuit court and allowed

Id. at 252-58. (Davis, J., dissenting). Justice Davis also focused on plaintiffs' failure to
appropriately respond to the motion for summary judgment with transcripts and other evidence,
finding the record did not contain the materials they relied upon. Id.
s1
For cases finding that the proffered expert was not qualified to offer expert testimony, see
Farley v. Shook, 629 S.E.2d 739 (W. Va. 2006) (emergency medicine physician did not have
knowledge or skill and therefore was not qualified to testify to the standard of care applicable to
podiatrists); Green v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 600 S.E.2d 340, 345-46 (W. Va. 2004)
(trial court did not commit reversible err in prohibiting plaintiffs expert, a nurse administrator,
from testifying about hospital's duty to warn of hazards of blood factor concentrate in light of her
qualifications on the subject, which were debatable at best); Kiser v. Caudill, 599 S.E.2d 826 (W.
Va. 2004) (plaintiffs expert was not qualified to testify on the applicable standard of care, as he
indicated that he had no knowledge of the standard of care outside of his hospital and was not an
expert on the medical condition at issue, had never written on the subject or performed any scientific studies, and could not cite any medical textbooks or literature to support his opinions).
519
655 S.E.2d 126 (W. Va. 2007).
517

520

Id. at 310.

521

443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 (1994).
Jones, 655 S.E.2d at 132.
Id.
694 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 2010).

522
523
524
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to testify "within his areas of expertise and within the limits as expressed by
him." 525
The defendant argued that Dr. Brown was not qualified and should not
have been allowed to testify outside his area of expertise about the effects of
exposure.52 6 The court found that even though Dr. Brown was not a physician or
toxicologist, his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education qualified
him as an expert, and his testimony was within his demonstrated expertise.527
Weaknesses could be explored in cross examination. In a stringent dissent, Justice Ketchum challenged Dr. Brown's qualifications to offer the broad testimony
allowed by the circuit court. 52 8
The court's reluctance to exclude expert testimony was also illustrated
in San Francisco v. Wendy's International,Inc.529 In San Francisco, the court
reversed the exclusion of plaintiffs' experts in a case of food poisoning,"o finding that the experts were qualified to offer expert testimony under Gentry v.
Mangum' and that their testimony was reliable under the Daubert/Wilt analysis. More importantly, the court issued two new syllabus points:
Because the summary judgment process does not conform well
to the discipline and analysis that Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W. Va. 39, 443
S.E.2d 196 (1993) impose, the Daubert/Wilt regime should be
employed only with great care and circumspection at the summary judgment stage. Courts must be cautious--except when defects are obvious on the face of a proffered expert opinion--not
to exclude debatable scientific evidence without affording the
proponent of the evidence adequate opportunity to defend its
admissibility. Given the plain language of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence, the side trying to defend the admission of
expert evidence must be given an adequate chance to do so.532
A medical opinion based upon a properly performed differential
diagnosis is sufficiently valid to satisfy the reliability prong of
the Rule 702 inquiry under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469
525

526
527
528
529

Id. at 866.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 916-17 (Ketchum, J., dissenting).
656 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 2007).

530

Id. at 502.

53

466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
Wendy's, 656 S.E.2d at Syl. pt. 4.

532
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(1993) and Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W. Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196
(1993). A differential diagnosis is a tested methodology, has
been subjected to peer review/publication, does not frequently
lead to incorrect results, and is generally accepted in the medical community. Opinions based on differential diagnosis must
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, ensuring that the medical
expert's application of the technique is reliable and proper in
each case.53
Both of these principles embody the court's preference for the admissibility, rather than the exclusion, of expert testimony, as reflected by Justice Davis, who noted in her concurring opinion:
All too often this Court is called upon to decide a case in which
the trial court has been reluctant to permit an expert witness to
testify despite the fact that the witness's credentials qualify
him/her as an expert and the matters about which the expert is
called to testify are both relevant and reliable to the case at
hand. Rather than freezing like a proverbial deer in the headlights, however, trial courts should be mindful that scientific
evidence presented through expert witnesses is presumptively

admissible. 53 4
L

Expert Witnesses: "Sham" Affidavits, Deadlines,& Disqualification

Three cases address the "sham" affidavit doctrine, which deals with
changing testimony of experts after deposition to avoid summary judgment or
exclusion of the experts.
Kiser v. Caudill (Kiser 17)s3s was a remand after a reversal of the circuit
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law for the defendant based on inadequate expert testimony in Kiser I.536 On remand, the defendants deposed the
533

Id. at Syl. pt. 5.
Id. at 502 (Davis, J., concurring).
5
599 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 2004).
536
The first time, Kiser v. Caudill, 557 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 2001) (Kiser 1), resulted in a per
curam opinion reversing judgment as a matter of law for the physician defendant. The circuit
court dismissed the case because one of the plaintiffs experts was unqualified, and the other was
disclosed late. Id. at 247. Plaintiffs expert, a neurologist, conceded in deposition and trial he did
not hold himself out to be an expert in neurosurgery, did not know the standard of care for the
treatment at issue, and did not plan to testify about the standard of care required of a neurosurgeon. Id. at 250. At trial, during cross-examination, he acknowledged that he was not qualified or
trained in the field of neurosurgery and was not familiar with the manner in which neurosurgical
procedures are performed. Id. "Given [the expert's] own admissions about his limited knowledge
of neurosurgery, we do not find that the circuit court erred by limiting his testimony at trial to the
field of neurology." Id. Clearly, the Kiser I opinion has good language affirming the discretion of
the circuit court as to the unqualified expert.
534
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plaintiffs' late disclosed expert and then moved to strike the expert's testimony
and for summary judgment. In response, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit
from the expert, which created an issue of fact, but which contradicted his depoThe Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed
sition testimony.
the striking of the "sham" affidavit:
[T]o defeat summary judgment, an "affidavit that directly contradicts prior deposition testimony is generally insufficient to
create a genuine issue of fact for trial, unless the contradiction is
adequately explained. To determine whether the witness's explanation for the contradictory affidavit is adequate, the circuit
court should examine: (1) Whether the deposition afforded the
opportunity for direct and cross-examination of the witness; (2)
whether the witness had access to pertinent evidence or information prior to or at the time of his or her deposition, or whether the affidavit was based upon newly discovered evidence not
known or available at the time of the deposition; and (3) whether the earlier deposition testimony reflects confusion, lack of recollection or other legitimate lack of clarity that the affidavit
justifiably attempts to explain."S39
With the exclusion of the "sham" affidavit, the court affirmed summary
judgment because plaintiffs expert was admittedly not qualified.5 4 0 He conceded he was not an expert on the medical condition at issue, had never written
on the subject, nor performed any scientific studies, and could not cite any medical textbooks or literature to support his opinions. 54 1
The second case in the "sham" affidavit trilogy, State ex rel. Krivchenia
v. Karl, dealt with post-deposition changes to an expert's opinions, wherein the
Supreme Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court's ruling prohibiting the defense expert from testifying. 5 42 After the expert testified in deposition that
"standard of care" was a term used by lawyers and that he did not intend to
opine on the standard of care, the plaintiffs' motion to exclude was granted by
the circuit court.5 43 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider and submitted an
affidavit from the expert, in which he stated that after his deposition, be was
advised of the meaning of the legal term "standard of care" and believed that the

537

Kiser II, 599 S.E.2d at 829.

538

Id.

5

Id. (quoting Yahnke v. Carson, 613 N.W.2d 102, 109 (Wis. 2000)).

540

Kiser II, 599 S.E.2d at 834.

541

Id.

542

600 S.E.2d 315, 321 (W. Va. 2004).

543

Id. at 319.

.
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defendant physician did not breach the standard of care.'" The Supreme Court
of Appeals held it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to deny the
defendant's motion for reconsideration. 54 Justice McGraw dissented.5 4 6
The third case in the "sham" affidavit trilogy is Calhoun v. Traylor,5 4 7
which followed Kiser , 548 and adopted the Rohrbaugh v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc. 5 49 approach to "sham" affidavits. Calhoun affirmed summary judgment
where the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from their expert in opposition to
defendants' motion for summary judgment which "directly contradict[ed]" his
deposition testimony.550
Closely related to the "sham" affidavit doctrine is the enforcement of
deadlines to identify experts and provide information about their opinions. The
Supreme Court of Appeals addressed these issues in Farley v. Shook.5 ' The
plaintiffs sued two podiatrists, an emergency room physician, and a hospital for
medical professional liability arising from a post-surgical infection which ended
in an amputation.5 52 The circuit court held a mandatory status conference, then
entered an agreed order requiring the plaintiffs to prove liability and causation
with expert testimony, and also entered a scheduling order setting deadlines for
the disclosure of expert witnesses by all parties. 553
The plaintiffs disclosed a single expert-an emergency medicine physician.554 The defendants, after an agreed extension, identified experts, and then
deposed plaintiffs' expert. 5 5 Although plaintiffs' expert testified that the defendant emergency room physician and hospital nurses were negligent, he "was
unable to link [the negligence] to the ultimate outcome," and further testified he
would defer to an infectious disease specialist on issues of causation. 55 6
"[B]ecause his area of expertise is emergency medicine, he did not testify as to
any deviation of the standard of care as it would apply to podiatrists .. . .. "7
The circuit court granted the hospital and emergency room physician's
joint motion for summary judgment, to which plaintiffs did not respond with

"

Id. at 320.

545

Id.

546

Id. at 321 (McGraw, J., dissenting).

547

624 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 2005).
Kiser v. Caudill, 557 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 2001).
916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
Calhoun, 624 S.E.2d at 504-05.
629 S.E.2d 739 (W. Va. 2006).

548
549
550
551
552

Id. at 742-43.

553

Id. at 743.

554

Id
Id.

555
556
5s7

Id. at 745.
Id. at 743.
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pleadings or affidavits, based on the lack of causation testimony.ss The podiatrists then filed a summary judgment motion based on the lack of expert testimony as to liability.559 The plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the order dismissing
the hospital and emergency room physician.560 The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider and also granted the podiatrists' motion for summary judgment.56 1
The plaintiffs challenged both grants of summary judgment on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the order dismissing the hospital and
emergency room physician for lack of adequate causation.562 However, the court
reversed summary judgment for the podiatrists, finding the circuit court should
have given the plaintiffs additional time to name experts.563 Although the court
agreed that the plaintiffs' only identified expert did not establish liability against
the podiatrists, "the particular facts of this case require scrutiny beyond [the
plaintiffs' expert's] competence to testify about podiatry practices."'" Specifically, the court examined the circuit court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion
to extend the time to identify expert witnesses and found significant the fact that
plaintiffs' counsel had granted the defendants' request for an extension of their
expert disclosure deadline on two separate occasions "without hesitation" and
therefore expected the same courtesy from defense counsel when plaintiffs'
counsel requested an extension.5 65 However, defendant's counsel opposed plaintiffs' counsel's request for additional time to disclose experts. 566 The court
found unfairness in such lack of reciprocal courtesy. 56 7
The court further focused on the plaintiffs' inability to depose the defendant podiatrists until after the expert deadline had already passed, suggesting it
was unfair to hold plaintiffs to the agreed deadline under the circumstances and
implying that the expert deadlines were not so set in stone. 68 Reversing sum558

Id.

559

Id.

560

Id.
Id

561
562

Id. at 748.

563

Id.
Id. at 746.

s6
565

Id. at 747.

566

Id
Id.

567
568

Id Commenting on the agreements between counsel, in a footnote, the court noted:
We take this opportunity to point out that this case emphasizes the importance
of complying with the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure when parties
request alterations to scheduling orders, and further prescribes the necessity of
reducing parties' agreements to writing. In this case, the defendant doctors and
St. Mary's had requested extensions of their expert disclosure deadlines,
which were memorialized in stipulations signed by all counsel. These written
stipulations were filed with the circuit court on January 13, 2003, and again on
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mary judgment, the court stated these impediments meant that the plaintiffs
"were not afforded adequate time to identify experts in light of the impediments
with which they were faced. Therefore, it follows that the summary judgment
awarded to Dr. Shook and Dr. Miller, on the basis that no expert existed to testify against them, must be reversed." 56 9 While the court will enforce scheduling
orders, Farley's reversal of the podiatrists' dismissal suggests it will not do so in
the face of arguments that one party gained unfair advantage.17 0
In addition to expert deadlines, the Supreme Court of Appeals has also
addressed when an expert must be disqualified. In State ex rel. Billups v.
Clawges,71 the court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiffs' motion to disqualify an expert from testifying for the defendants. The expert had previously been consulted by the plaintiffs pre-suit. 57 2
After reviewing the medical records, the expert advised the plaintiffs that his
review did not support the issuance of a certificate of merit, so the plaintiffs then
obtained a certificate of merit from another physician and filed suit.573 The defendants then independently located and retained the expert to review the medical records. 574 After receiving the records, the expert advised the defendants that
he had previously reviewed the records for the plaintiffs and had given them a
negative review.5 75 The defendants terminated their consultation with the expert
at that point and advised plaintiffs of their contact with the expert and their desire to retain him as an expert. Plaintiffs objected, claiming that the expert was
their "non-testifying expert" to whom they had provided a confidential medical
March 14, 2003. When counsel for the Farleys realized the need for an extension, a similar practice should have been employed instead of relying on a
professional courtesy that never materialized. The particular facts of this case,
including the obstacles the defendant doctors and St. Mary's placed before the
Farleys, and the inequity in not allowing the Farleys an opportunity to develop
an expert witness against Dr. Shook and Dr. Miller, allow this Court to remedy the injustice on the Farleys. Finally, to the extent that parties do agree to alter a scheduling order, even if the agreement is in writing, the parties must also be aware that such agreement ultimately requires approval by the circuit
court.
Id. at 747 n. 3.
569

Id.

For cases where the court enforced expert deadlines, see Jenkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 649
S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2007) (per curiam) (upholding trial court's decision to prohibit plaintiffs
medical expert from offering an opinion on causation due to plaintiffs failure to disclose the
opinion prior to trial); Graham v. Wallace, 588 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 2003) (party's failure to fully
disclose the substance of expert witness's expected testimony prior to trial constituted unfair surprise in violation of discovery rules and therefore required a new trial).
57
620 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 2005).
572
Id. at 165-66.
5
Id. at 165.
570

574

Id.

57

Id
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summary and had disclosed their theory of the case.576 Plaintiffs then sought a
writ of prohibition after the circuit court denied their motion to prohibit the defendants from retaining the expert. 77
The court denied plaintiffs' writ, finding that the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify the expert. 78 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the following test for expert witness disqualification in such context:
In cases where disqualification of an expert witness is sought,
the party moving for disqualification bears the burden of proving that at the time the moving party consulted with the expert:
(1) it was objectively reasonable for the moving party to have
concluded that a confidential relationship existed with the expert; and (2) confidential or privileged information was disclosed to the expert by the moving party. Disqualification is
warranted only when the evidence satisfactorily demonstrates
the presence of both of these conditions. 579
Applying the law to the facts at hand, the court found "it was objectively reasonable for Petitioners to conclude that a confidential relationship had
existed with the doctor during the consultation period."" Regarding the second
prong of the test, the court determined, based on its in-camerareview of sealed
documents in the record, that no confidential information was disclosed to the
expert by plaintiffs, given that the information contained in them was either
contained in the medical records, pre-suit filings, and pleadings, or would be
discoverable under the Rules of Civil Procedure.58 1
J.

Evidence, Procedure,Trial and Other Issues

1.

Jury Selection Issues

In Murphy v. Miller, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
reversed a defense verdict in an MPLA case arising out of a birth injury, finding
that statements by a physician juror demonstrated disqualifying bias that should
have resulted in a strike for cause.582 The court reviewed its jurisprudence on
jury bias, and then examined closely the statements of the challenged juror:
576

Id. at 166.

577

579

Id
Id. at 169.
Id. at Syl. pt. 3.

ss0

Id. at 168.

581

Id
671 S.E.2d 714, 722 (W. Va. 2008).

578

582
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[A] prospective juror, Dr. Walter, clearly demonstrated his prejudice and/or bias during voir dire. The voir dire of Dr. Walter
was conducted in two phases. First, Dr. Walter answered a series of questions presented to all potential jurors in the form of a
written juror questionnaire. Second, based upon Dr. Walter's
answers in that questionnaire, he was further questioned in
chambers. The answers provided by Dr. Walter on the initial
written juror questionnaire revealed that Dr. Walter, in his capacity as a dentist, had been the defendant in what he identified
as a "frivolous lawsuit settled out of court. . . ." In response to a

written question eliciting his opinion on "providing compensation for pain and suffering, mental anguish, or other emotional
damage as the result of the negligence of doctors or other health
care professionals," Dr. Walter wrote that "[c]ompensation
needs to be provided in some cases but with limits." Dr. Walter
also explained in the written juror questionnaire that this state
"has some of the highest health care insurance rates because of
medical malpractice lawsuits and their verdicts." Further, Dr.
Walter stated in the written questionnaire that "frivolous lawsuits cost everyone except the attorneys involved."083
During the subsequent verbal evaluation of Dr. Walter in chambers, he answered a question regarding pain and suffering damages, stating that "[i]t would be hard to justify an amount for
pain and suffering. I don't know that there's any way you can
compensate people for that." Dr. Walter was asked whether he
could follow the trial court's instructions concerning damages,
setting "aside whatever notions you might have personally
about damages. . . ." He replied, "I would try." When ques-

tioned further about his ability to disregard "your personal
views about what you may think the law is or ought to be . . .,"
Dr. Walter responded, "I can say I would try to follow the instructions of the Court, yes, whatever."5 84
With regard to his own personal experience as a defendant in a
medical malpractice action, Dr. Walter admitted, "obviously,
I'm going to be a little bit prejudiced." He also expressed specific hesitation in awarding damages for anything less than a deliberate act, explaining that he would be able to bring a lawsuit
seeking to recover damages for a relative of his "[i]f it was a deliberate act, if it was something like that, I guess, deliberate 583

Id at 716.

584

Id. at 721-22.
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if it was an accident, if it wasn't. I don't know, it would be a
tough call, to be honest." Dr. Walter continued: "We're all human. We all make mistakes. We should be accountable for it,
but I don't know." When asked whether he believed medical
professionals ought to be less accountable, he responded, "I
wouldn't say less accountable, but I think we need to take into
consideration what's going on."s 85
Discussing two other challenged jurors, the court found that the plaintiff
waived any challenge because she failed to move to strike one of them for
cause. Examining the testimony of the other, the court found no abuse of discretion in refusing to strike for cause.
The court considered similar arguments in Macek v. Jones.8 In Macek,
the court applied O'Dell v. Miller 589 and found that because the jurors challenged by the plaintiff did not make disqualifying statements of bias, the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them to serve:
Upon this Court's independent examination of the transcript of
the voir dire proceedings in this case, we are unable to conclude
that either Juror George or Juror Stolburg made a clear statement of disqualifying bias toward Dr. Jones or Weirton Medical
Center sufficient to disqualify him from serving on the jury.
While we believe that the trial court was correct to conclude
that the jurors' initial comments compelled further inquiry by
the trial court, we find that such additional questioning revealed
that each of these potential jurors was free from disqualifying
bias or prejudice. The trial court competently considered the totality of the circumstances and conducted a comprehensive inquiry before determining that the jurors were competent to
serve. 590
Despite reversing on this basis, the court addressed plaintiffs claims
that the defendants were improperly given separate "strikes" and found sufficient adversity between the defendants to justify them)91 Scrutinizing the claims
against the physician and nurse, the court stated:

5
586
587
588
589
590
5'

Id.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
671 S.E.2d 707 (W. Va. 2008).
565 S.E.2d 407 (W. Va. 2002).
Macek, 671 S.E.2d at 713-14.
Murphy v. Miller, 671 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 2008).
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Examining the factors enumerated in Price [v. Charleston Area
Medical Center 629 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 2005)], this Court observes that the record reveals that the respective interests of Dr.
Burech and Nurse Asher are indeed antagonistic. Separate
claims of negligence were alleged against Dr. Burech and Nurse
Asher, the acts occurred at different points in time, they were
represented by separate counsel, and the verdict form submitted
to the jury required it to apportion liability, if found, between
Dr. Burech and the West Virginia University Board of Governors based upon Nurse Asher's actions. The two did not share a
common defense theory, and a specific factual dispute arose regarding the conversation that occurred during the telephone call
on the night Shawn was born. The Appellants claimed that
Nurse Asher was obligated to advise Dr. Burech regarding
treatments, Nurse Asher contended that she did provide such
recommendation; and Dr. Burech disputed that testimony. The
provision of bicarbonate, volume, and generous oxygen was one
of the very essential issues at trial.5 92
State v. Newcomb,593 which applied the O'Dell rule in a criminal case,
clarifies that clear statements of bias require disqualification; however, responses to general questions are not enough and require further inquiry:
When a prospective juror makes a clear statement of bias during
voir dire, the prospective juror is automatically disqualified and
must be removed from the jury panel for cause. However, when
a juror makes an inconclusive or vague statement that only indicates the possibility of bias or prejudice, the prospective juror
must be questioned further by the trial court and/or counsel to
determine if actual bias or prejudice exists. Likewise, an initial
response by a prospective juror to a broad or general question
during voir dire will not, in and of itself, be sufficient to determine whether a bias or prejudice exists. In such a situation, further inquiry by the trial court is required. Nonetheless, the trial
court should exercise caution that such further voir dire questions to a prospective juror should be couched in neutral language intended to elicit the prospective juror's true feelings, beliefs, and thoughts - and not in language that suggests a specific response, or otherwise seeks to rehabilitate the juror. Thereafter, the totality of the circumstances must be considered, and

592

Id. at 724.

5

679 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 2009).
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where there is a probability of bias the prospective juror must
be removed from the panel by the trial court for cause.59 4
In Mikesinovich v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital, the Supreme Court of

Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded a defense verdict because "the
spouse of one of the jurors was a long-time employee of one of the parties to the
case."5 95 The Supreme Court of Appeals found the circuit court abused its discretion in not striking the juror, whose wife worked at the defendant hospital for
twenty-three years, for cause on motion of the plaintiff.59 6 The Supreme Court
of Appeals found:
[T]he relationship of Juror W with the hospital was fairly close.
Leaving aside the normal associational ties of a person with
their spouse's employer, Juror W's earning power, household
income, and family welfare was directly and specifically dependent in part on one of the parties to the lawsuit. Moreover,
the juror's spouse worked at the specific physical location
where the alleged acts of negligence occurred, and in the same
job classification as the individual hospital employee who is alleged to have been negligent. As the cases cited supra indicate,
such a prospective juror has regularly been held by a wide variety of courts under settled principles of law to be disqualified
from service - precisely because of a close relationship to one
of the parties.597
Thomas v. Makani is an interesting case on juror disqualification, as it
appears to sway from the rule that former patients of a physician must be
struck.5 98 Thomas suggests that if voir dire does not expose bias, they are not
automatically struck, and restates the rule that you must object to the refusal to
strike a juror for cause.5 99
2.

Multiple Defendants and Jury Selection

In Price v. CharlestonArea Medical Center, Inc., the circuit court gave

separate sets of peremptory challenges to the three defendants, while giving
only three challenges to the plaintiff. 600 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ap-

s95

Id. at 691-92.
640 S.E.2d 560, 560 (W. Va. 2006).

596

[d.

597

Id. at 563-64.

594

598

624 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va. 2005).

5

Id. at 585-86.

600

619 S.E.2d 176, 181 (W. Va. 2005).
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peals of West Virginia reversed the defense verdict, holding that defendants are
entitled to separate peremptory challenges only if they are "antagonistic" or
"hostile."'o The court issued three pertinent syllabus points:
In the determination by the trial court of the number of peremptory challenges to be allowed two or more plaintiffs or two or
more defendants pursuant to Rule 47(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs or defendants with like interests are ordinarily to be considered as a single party for the
purpose of allocating the challenges. Where, however, the interests of the plaintiffs or the interests of the defendants are antagonistic or hostile, the trial court, in its discretion, may allow
the plaintiffs or the defendants separate peremptory challenges,
upon motion, and upon a showing that separate peremptory
challenges are necessary for a fair trial.602
In determining whether the interests of two or more plaintiffs or
two or more defendants are antagonistic or hostile for purposes
of allowing separate peremptory challenges under Rule 47(b) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the allegations in
the complaint, the representation of the plaintiffs or defendants
by separate counsel and the filing of separate answers are not
enough. Rather, the trial court should also consider the stated
positions and assertions of counsel and whether the record indicates that the respective interests are antagonistic or hostile. In
the case of two or more defendants, the trial court should consider a number of additional factors including, but not limited
to: (1) whether the defendants are charged with separate acts of
negligence or wrongdoing, (2) whether the alleged negligence
or wrongdoing occurred at different points of time, (3) whether
negligence, if found against the defendants, is subject to apportionment, (4) whether the defendants share a common theory of
defense and (5) whether cross claims have been filed. To warrant separate peremptory challenges, the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be, as proponents, bear the burden of
showing that their interests are antagonistic or hostile and that
separate peremptory challenges are necessary for a fair trial.os
In ruling upon the request of two or more plaintiffs or two or
more defendants for separate peremptory challenges under Rule
601
602
603

Id. at 185.
Id. at Syl. pt. 2.
Id. at Syl. pt. 3.
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47(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial

court shall set forth, on the record, its reasons for so ruling in a
manner sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. 60
Kominar v. Health Management Associates of West Virginia, Inc.,

which also reversed a defense verdict, touches upon issues related to the trial of
cases involving multiple defendants, including jury strikes, multiple experts,
cross-examination, and lost medical records.6 0o
Kominar arose from the treatment of a patient, who was involved in a
catastrophic automobile accident, taken immediately to the emergency room,
and pronounced dead fifty minutes later. The pronouncement was made eleven
minutes after he arrived at the hospital emergency room.606 The plaintiffs
claimed that an endotracheal tube was misplaced by the paramedics and that the
emergency room physician failed to timely discover it.60 ' After a defense verdict
at trial, the court reversed, primarily due to the circuit court's decision to allow
the defendants to have separate peremptory challenges.608
Addressing the peremptory challenge issue, the Supreme Court of Appeals enforced Price.6 09 Agreeing that the circuit court addressed the issue, the
court did not defer to its conclusion, but rather found a lack of adversity among
the defendants. 1 0 "It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to allow separate
peremptory challenges absent such showing because of the risk of affording coparties a clear tactical advantage of collectively exercising their challenges
against their opponent rather than each other." 61 1
Rather than requiring a demonstration of prejudice by the plaintiff, the
court issued a blanket rule requiring reversal where too many peremptory challenges are given to defendants, issuing a new syllabus point: "Once an error in
the allocation of peremptory challenges is found on appeal because the record
below prior to the swearing of the jury does not show a serious dispute constituting hostile or antagonistic positions among co-parties, reversal and a new trial
will be granted the adversely affected litigant." 612 The court also addressed the
issue of spoliation of certain records:
The records in question are the original and hospital copy of the
ambulance accident report or "run sheet," the printout of the
604
605

Id. at Syl. pt. 4.
648 S.E.2d 48 (W. Va. 2007).

606

Id. at 53.

607

Id
Id. at 59.
619 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 2005).
Kominar, 648 S.E.2d at 57.

608

609
610
611
612

-d.
Id. at Syl. pt. 6.
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EKG taken by MCAS paramedics, and the printout of the EKG
run at WMH. The evidence produced at trial reflects that the
original run sheet was initially lost and when it eventually surfaced it had been facially altered; the hospital copy of the run
sheet was never located. The evidence also revealed that the
EKG monitor strip run by MCAS was never found. The testimony of three paramedics included speculations that the EKG
strips were stapled to the undiscovered hospital copy of the run
sheet which was left in the emergency room, or the strips were
not salvageable because they were bloodied and trampled during the course of the rescue efforts. The EKG strip of the test
performed at WMH was not lost, but only representative portions of the strip were retained in the hospital's medical
records.
The court applied the factors set forth in Tracy v. Cottrell, which require examination of:
(1) the party's degree of control, ownership, possession or authority over the destroyed evidence; (2) the amount of prejudice
suffered by the opposing party as a result of the missing or destroyed evidence and whether such prejudice was substantial;
(3) the reasonableness of anticipating that the evidence would
be needed for litigation; and (4) if the party controlled, owned,
possessed or had authority over the evidence, the party's degree
of fault in causing the destruction of the evidence.614
The court found there was insufficient evidence to require an adverse
instruction against the hospital, stating that "the paramedics [sic] testimony did
not establish that the hospital copy of the run sheet was actually delivered to
anyone in the emergency room or that the ambulance run EKG strips were ever
attached to that copy of the run sheet, the first prong of the Tracy test was not
proven."61 5 To the contrary, the record suggested an instruction was warranted
as to the records lost by the EMTs.616
The plaintiff also challenged the circuit court's refusal to allow cross
examination about the hospital's discovery responses, which initially did not
disclose the run sheet that was later produced.6 17 On this issue, the court found:

613

Id. at 59.

614

615

Id. at 59-60 (quoting Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d at Syl. pt. 2).
Id. at 60.

616

Id.

617

Id.
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We find no error in the trial court's conclusions about this matter. The record indicates that the triage sheet was ultimately
produced before trial and its initial omission did not prejudice
Appellant. As to the list of individuals providing treatment, the
hospital explained that it compiled the list from the names of
people on duty at the time of the accident holding positions it
believed relevant to the injuries sustained. The list was not
compiled from the medical records of the decedent and some of
the names supplied had not provided treatment. We agree with
the trial court that this evidence was not critical to any matter
Appellant had to establish in her malpractice claim and it did
not bolster her spoliation argument.618
The court also addressed plaintiffs claim that in opening statements,
defendants violated an in limine ruling prohibiting discussion of the
the
one of
investigation of the automobile accident, as well as the admission of the testimony of the investigating officer that he was not surprised the patient did not
survive. 61 9 The court found counsel's argument did not violate the pretrial ruling, but admission of the officer's testimony did, and the court cautioned the
620
circuit court to "careful[ly] and steadfast[ly] adhere" to the rulings on retrial.
The court affirmed the exclusion of the testimony of an embalmer that
the patient did not "leak" embalming fluid from any major arteries, finding the
witness had not been disclosed as an expert prior to trial.62' On this point, Justice Starcher urged, in his separate opinion, that the embalmer was qualified,
and on retrial, should be allowed to testify. 622
The court also addressed the issue of experts and cross examination of
experts in cases with multiple defendants. As to plaintiffs argument that the
defendants were improperly allowed multiple experts, the court, after a review
of West Virginia cases, stated:
Given the broad discretion afforded trial courts regarding evidentiary matters, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing each defendant to have separate experts.
We do note that the hospital's expert specializing in emergency
medicine essentially served to bolster the testimony of Dr. Zamora's own expert regarding whether the doctor performed in
accord with the standard of care. In essence, there were three
experts called to offer testimony supporting Dr. Zamora's
618

Id. at 60-61.

619

Id. at 61.

620

Id. at 62.

621

Id

622

Id. at 66 (Starcher, J., concurring).
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treatment of Mr. Kominar. While it is suitable for a trial court to
reconsider the number of experts a party may call when there
are changes in circumstances during the course of trial such as
the directed verdict granted for the hospital in this case, we do
not find that refusing to do so necessarily results in an imbalance of fairness to all parties.6 23
On remand, the Supreme Court of Appeals directed the circuit court to
examine the adversity between a party and a particular expert before allowing
cross examination.624 Of concern to the court was allowing defendants to cross
examine each other's experts to show they are not critical of their client, when
their direct examination only supported the party retaining the expert: 625
It would be virtually impossible to try complex multiparty litigation if every party had the unbridled right to cross-examine
witnesses called by every other party on issues not related, or
only tangentially related, to the witness' testimony in chief. We,
therefore, hold that trial courts should carefully examine whether an adversarial relationship exists between co-parties at the
time a motion to limit cross examination is raised in order to
avoid the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay.626
Kominar is important in any case tried with multiple defendants. It
makes clear that if separate jury challenges are allowed, the defendants proceed
at the risk of losing any verdict. It provides a powerful tool to plaintiffs to limit
the cross examination of defense experts. Both issues require defendants seeking
separate challenges or cross examination to make a careful record.
3.

The "Empty Chair"

In Green v. CharlestonArea Medical Center, Inc. ,627 the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia reversed a defense verdict in a MPLA case based
on arguments blaming an absent party made by defense counsel during opening
statements and closing arguments.628
Green involved the claims of a hemophiliac who developed HIV/AIDS
and subsequently died after being administered blood products in the emergency

623
624
625

Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64-65.

626

Id. at 65.

627

600 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 2004).
Id. at 346.

628
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room after a mining accident. 629 His estate instituted a wrongful death action
against the manufacturer of the blood product, the emergency room physician,
and the hospital. 6 30 The manufacturer settled, and the case proceeded to trial
against the doctor and hospital. 63 1 After a defense verdict, the plaintiff appealed
on multiple grounds.632 The plaintiff first argued that the physician's attorney
made improper and prejudicial remarks to the jury.633 The physician's counsel,
according to the Supreme Court of Appeals, actively argued that fault in the
case was that of manufacturer and the laboratory division, who had settled and
were not present at trial.634 At the conclusion of opening statements, plaintiffs
counsel objected and moved for mistrial. 635 The motion was denied, and similar
remarks were made by defense counsel during closing argument without objection. 636
Citing Groves v. Compton637 and Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,638 the
court held that defense counsel's arguments were improper. 63 9 "[A]n argument
attributing blame to an absent party, where the evidence of that party's liability
has not been fully developed, allows a jury to speculate inappropriately regarding the absent party's role in the case." 640 The court also found that there was no
factual support for certain assertions made during argument.641 Because defense
counsel attributed sole blame to the absent defendant, the court found the remarks prejudicial and reversed and remanded for a new trial.642
4.

Evidence of Disability Award

Brooks v. Galen of West Virginia, Inc., affirmed the circuit court's ruling, which took judicial notice of and admitted the plaintiffs social security
award as evidence of the cause of the plaintiffs disability (which contradicted
the plaintiffs attempt to claim her injury and inability to work resulted from
malpractice).6 43 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found:

632

Id. at 342.
Id at 342-43.
Id at 343
Id

633

Id.

634

Id. at 344.

635

Id.

636

Id.
280 S.E.2d 708 (W. Va. 1981).
558 S.E.2d 663 (W. Va. 2001).

629
630
631

637
638
639

Green, 600 S.E.2d at 344.

640

Id.

641

Id. at 345.

642

Id

6

649 S.E.2d 272, 283 (W. Va. 2007).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

87

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 8
660

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 114

The fact that a workers' compensation claimant has been
awarded social security disability benefits is persuasive evidence that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled for
workers' compensation purposes, and where social security disability is founded on work-related medical conditions that are
substantially similar to those being asserted in connection with
a workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability,
the social security disability award should be given considerable
weight. 644
The court further noted that the plaintiff failed to object to the introduction of the social security evidence, thereby waiving it on appeal; moreover, the
court held the "plain error" doctrine did not apply.645 The court also affirmed the
exclusion of plaintiffs expert testimony against the emergency room physician,
finding it was never disclosed pre-trial or in two depositions of the expert.646
A similar issue was addressed in Murphy v. Miller.64 7 The plaintiff challenged the circuit court overruling an objection to the introduction of ,evidence
of "educational or other public benefits or services available to [the infant]"
during cross examination of his life care expert.648 Examining the testimony, the
court stated:
Upon thorough review of this matter, this Court declines to find
reversible error on this issue. In Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W. Va.
779, 280 S.E.2d 584 (1981), this Court observed that the admission of collateral source evidence is harmless where "the jury
did not reach the damage issue but disposed of the case against
the plaintiff on the liability issue." Id. at 788, 280 S.E.2d at 590.
That is precisely the situation in the present case since the jury
found for the Appellees on the issue of liability and never
reached the issue of damages. We consequently find that any
admission of testimony regarding future benefits to which
Shawn would have been entitled was harmless.6 49

Id. at Syl. pt. 9 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Lambert v. Workers' Comp. Div., 566 S.E.2d 573 (W.
Va. 2002)).
6
Id. at 278-79.
646
Id. at 282-83. On close examination, it is difficult to square Brooks v. Galen with the later
opinion in Estate ofFout-Iser ex rel. Fout-Iser v. Hahn, 649 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 2007).
6
671 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 2008).
648
Id. at 726.
649
Id. at 727 (citing Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584, 590 (W. Va. 1981).
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Death Certificates

5.

In Goldizen v. Grant County Nursing Home,650 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to a defendant nursing home in a wrongful death action after the physician
who signed the decedent's death certificate later changed his mind as to the
cause of death. During his deposition, the physician, who was disclosed by
plaintiffs as their sole expert on causation, testified that the cause of death he
certified on the death certificate (acute aspiration) was in error. 651' The nursing
home was granted summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs were
unable to establish causation.652
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, finding that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to causation. 5 Central to the court's decision was section 16-5-28(d), which provides that "[a] certified copy of a vital record issued
in accordance

. . . shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the

record." 6 54 In light of this statute, the court held that "a certified cause of death
listed on a death certificate is accorded primafacie weight as to the facts stated
therein." 5 s Because there was no equivocation as to the facts stated in the death
certificate, the court found that it was "entitled to be accorded the probative
value of prima facie evidence." 656 Regarding the physician later renouncing
during his deposition the accuracy of the death certificate, the court noted:
What Dr. Bensenhaver attempts to do through his deposition
testimony is to constructively amend Ms. Goldizen's death certificate which--if permitted--would undermine the integrity and
accuracy of our vital statistics records. The Legislature recognized the importance of properly amending or correcting a vital
statistics record:
In order to protect the integrity and accuracy of vital
records, a certificate or report registered under this article
may be amended only in accordance with the provisions of
this article or legislative rule.
W.Va. Code, 16-5-25(a) [2006]. (Emphasis added).

650
651
652
653
654

655
656

693 S.E.2d 346, 350 (W. Va. 2010).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 349 (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-28(d) (LexisNexis 2006)).
Id. at 350.
Id at 350.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

89

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

662

[Vol. 114

There is no indication in the record before us that Ms. Goldizen's death certificate has been amended as required by W.Va.
Code, 16-5-25(a) [2006]. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have prima facie evidence that Ms. Goldizen died as a result of "acute

aspiration.",6 57
Regarding the physician's inconsistent statements on causation, the
court determined that "such inconsistencies go to the weight to be afforded his
testimony. It is for a jury to decide what weight to give that testimony." 65 8
6.

Learned Intermediary

In State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia considered a writ of prohibition seeking to compel the
circuit court to apply the "learned intermediary" doctrine. 65 9 The case arose
from a death of plaintiffs decedent alleged to have been caused by taking Propulsid@. 66 0 The plaintiffs sued the prescribing physician and the manufacturer
of the drug. 661 After a period of discovery, the defendant manufacturer filed a
motion for summary judgment, asserting "that, under the learned intermediary
doctrine, it had fulfilled its duty to warn by providing warnings regarding Propulsid@ to [the prescribing physician]."662 After the motion was denied due to
conflicting issues of fact, the manufacturer filed a pretrial motion in limine to
prohibit plaintiff from arguing it "had a duty to provide any warnings regarding
Upon denial of the motion, the
Propulsid@ to [the decedent] personally."
manufacturer filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.6 64
In a lengthy opinion penned by Justice Davis, the Supreme Court of
Appeals traced the origins of the learned intermediary doctrine and concluded
"under West Virginia products liability law, manufacturers of prescription drugs
are subject to the same duty to warn consumers about the risks of their products
as other manufacturers. [The Court] decline[d] to adopt the learned intermediary
exception to this general rule." 6 65
The court was influenced by the changing nature of direct marketing of
pharmaceuticals to consumers via the media and concluded essentially that drug
and device manufacturers should be treated no differently than manufacturers of
657

Id. at 350 (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-25(a) (LexisNexis 2006)).

658

Id. at 350.
647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007).
Id. at 901.

659
660
661
662
663
664
665

Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id at Syl. pt. 3.
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other goods. 6 Justice Maynard concurred, concerned that under the learned
intermediary doctrine, physicians were saddled with liability while manufacturers avoided it. 66 7 Justice Albright dissented, arguing the case should not have
been considered on a writ of prohibition because the record was incomplete, and
the court should have taken a more moderate approach, rather than wholesale
rejection of the doctrine.
7.

Waiver of Objection to Verdict

In State ex rel. Valley Radiology, Inc. v. Gaughan, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia denied a writ of prohibition to stop a new trial on
damages after a plaintiffs' verdict in a MPLA case on liability, where the jury
did not award noneconomic loss or lost wages. 6 69 The court rejected the argument that plaintiffs waived objection to the verdict by objecting to the circuit
court's offer to send back the issue of damages, issuing a new syllabus point:
"The general rule of waiver established by this Court in [Combs v. Hahn], which
requires that any objections to the verdict form based on defect or irregularity be
made prior to the jury's dismissal, is not applicable to post-trial motions seeking
relief based on the inadequacy of the damages awarded."67 0
8.

Nursing Home Arbitration Agreements

In Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corporation, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia issued its opinion in a trio of cases concerning the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in nursing home agreements.671 After a
lengthy analysis, the court held that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable as a matter of law. 6 72 Central to the court's ruling
was the fact that these arbitration agreements were entered into by the resident
or resident's representative at the time of the resident's admission to the nursing
home, or, in other words, prior to the alleged negligence and injury.673 The court
agreed with the defendants that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 6 74
preempted section 5(c) of West Virginia's Nursing Home Act,675 which effec-

666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675

Id. at 914.
Id. at 917 (Maynard, J., concurring).
Id. at 914 (Albright, J., dissenting).
640 S.E.2d 136, 140-42 (W. Va. 2006).
Id. at Syl. pt. 4.
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 2011 WL 2611327 (W. Va. June 29, 2011).
Id. at *49-73.
Id. at Syl. pt. 21.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16 (2006).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5C-1 to -20 (LexisNexis 1997).
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tively prohibits arbitration clauses. However, "after considering the history and
purposes of the FAA," the court determined that:
Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to arbitration
clauses in pre-injury contracts, where a personal injury or
wrongful death occurred after the signing of the contract. In the
context of pre-injury nursing home admission agreements, we
do not believe that such arbitration clauses are enforceable to
compel arbitration of a dispute concerning negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death.676
9.

Private Right of Action Under West Virginia Code § 49-6A-2

One interesting opinion upheld summary judgment, on multiple
grounds, for several different defendants against claims that they negligently
permitted child abuse to occur. In Barbina v. Curry,67 7 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held (1) there is no private right of action under the
child abuse reporting statute, Section 49-6A-2, affirming Arbaugh v. Board of
Education;678 (2) summary judgment was proper as to the Sheriff, to whom the
abuse was allegedly reported, because there was no evidence of abuse occurring
after the date of the report; 679 (3) summary judgment was proper as to the Department of Health and Human Resources ("DHHR"), 680 as there was no evidence of prior knowledge of abuse.6 81 Records from a mental health center of a
682
prior report were held insufficient to establish a jury issue on this point.
IV. OTHER LEGISLATION AFFECTING HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

In addition to the MPLA, the Legislature has enacted other statutes providing some degree of protection to health care providers against civil liability
in specific enumerated circumstances.
A.

Good Samaritans

The Legislature has enacted statutes protecting health care providers in
narrow areas, focusing on those providing emergency or volunteer services.
These "Good Samaritan" type statutes include limiting liability for licensed
676
677
678
679
680
681
682

Brown, 2011 WL 2611327, at *2.
650 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 2007).
591 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 2003), af'd by Barbina,650 S.E.2d at 146.
Barbina, 650 S.E.2d at 147.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148.
Id
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physicians who render emergency care at the scene of an accident 683 and as volunteers and in good faith at athletic events.684 Retired or retiring physicians
providing care for free to indigent or needy patients in clinics are immune from
liability, except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 685
B.

"Innocent" Prescribers

In 2005, the Legislature enacted a statute that protects health care providers who prescribe medications. 8 6 The "Innocent Prescriber Act" protects
health care providers who prescribe medications or medical devices for uses as
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.6 87 The Act, codified at section
55-7-23(a) of the West Virginia Code, provides:
No health care provider .

.

. is liable to a patient or third party

for injuries sustained as a result of the ingestion of a prescription drug or use of a medical device that was prescribed or used
by the health care provider in accordance with instructions approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration regarding the
dosage and administration of the drug, the indications for which
the drug should be taken or device should be used, and the contraindications against taking the drug or using the device: Provided, That [sic] the provisions of this section shall not apply if:
(1) the health care provider had actual knowledge that the drug
or device was inherently unsafe for the purpose for which it was
prescribed or used or (2) a manufacturer of such drug or device
publicly announces changes in the dosage or administration of
such drug or changes in contraindications against taking the
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-15 (LexisNexis 2006).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-19 (LexisNexis 2006).
685
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-1Oa(b) (LexisNexis 2007). The Legislature has also provided
protection to other "Good Samitaran" type activities, including good faith donation of food to
nonprofit organizations, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7D-1 (LexisNexis 2008); ski patrols rendering
emergency care, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-16 (LexisNexis 2008); directors of nonprofit or volunteer agencies, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7C-3 (LexisNexis 2008); immunity for trained hazardous
substance emergency response personnel who respond to the discharge of hazardous substances
and offer advice or assistance without remuneration, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-17 (LexisNexis
2008); and limited liability for personal injury or wrongful death cases for nonprofit organizations
arranging passage on "excursion trains" to scenic, historic or educational sites, W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-7-20 (LexisNexis 2008).
686
2005 W. Va. Acts 7, codified at W. VA. CODE § 55-7-23 (LexisNexis 2006).
687
Id. This Act was reportedly a compromise bill negotiated by the West Virginia State Medi683

684

cal Association and the West Virginia Trial Lawyers. See WEST VIRGINIA MEDICAL INSURANCE
AGENCY, LLC, AND WEST VIRGINIA STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 2005 LEGISLATIVE WRAP-UP

(2005),
available
at
http://www.wvsma.com/shared/content objects/helen/pdfs/2005%201egislative%20wrap%20up.p
df.
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drug or using the device and the health care provider fails to follow such publicly announced changes and such failure proximately caused or contributed to the plaintiffs injuries or damages.
Section 55-7-23(b) further specifies the section is "not intended to
create a new cause of action." 689 This provision 6 90 is silent as to whether it applies to suits filed after the effective date versus injuries sustained after the effective date; however, it likely applies to the latter.
This provision was driven, at least in part, by physicians who were sued
in the various mass tort actions arising from diet drugs (Baycol, Rezulin and
others),692 and by the concern over physician liability to third parties when a
patient under the influence of a- prescription medication causes injury. 693 This
statute is similar to section 30-5-12 of the West Virginia Code, which protects
pharmacists and pharmacies who dispense medications that are unchanged. 694
PhysicianApology

C.

Another bill passed in 2005 offers protection to physicians who apologize to their patients. 6 95 Section 55-7-11 a(b)(1) of the West Virginia Code provides that expressions of sympathy or apology by a health care provider to a
patient shall not be admissible as an admission of liability or as an admission
against interest in any civil action under the MPLA or in any arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding.696
The intent of this statute is to encourage candid communication between
physicians and patients after an untoward event. 9 This statute goes beyond
existing rules of evidence, which prohibit evidence of compromise or offers to

688

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-23(a) (LexisNexis 2008).

689

§

690

Id

691

Id

55-7-23(b).

See Baisden v. Bayer Corp., 275 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (physician fraudulently
joined in action against pharmaceutical company; motion to remand denied).
693
See Osborne v. United States, 567 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2002) (physician can be liable to
non-patients for negligent prescription of narcotics to patient who caused injury in automobile
accident). An interesting issue arises where the physician prescribes in a manner different than the
labeling or uses the drug or device "off label," both of which are accepted practices.
694
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-12 (LexisNexis 2006).
695
2005 W. Va. Acts 4, codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-1 la(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
692

696

Id.

See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1068
(1999).
697
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compromise 6 98 and payment of medical or other expenses, 699 neither of which is
admissible to prove liability. 00
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to identify a common theme or trend in Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia cases dealing with the MPLA, except to say the court
appears, at the least, uncomfortable with reforms that have the effect of blocking
citizens' access to the courts. This is reflected in the wide discretion given to
circuit court judges to deny motions to dismiss complaints absent almost a complete failure by plaintiffs to comply with the notice of claim and certificate of
merit requirements of the MPLA. It is reflected, perhaps more strongly, in the
court's rejection of the MPLA's twelve-juror provision as violative of its rulemaking power. In both instances, however, the court has declined to take the
larger step of declaring the entire MPLA invalid in a wholesale fashion despite
the opportunity presented in Louk to apply the non-severability clause as written. 701
There are many issues arising from the MPLA and its amendments yet
to be litigated. Constitutional challenges are certainly coming as to some or all
of the amendments, and issues remain regarding the pre-filing requirements.
Perhaps the most significant is the Boggs issue of what claims are not covered
under the MPLA.702 At least one circuit court judge has ruled that credentialing
and privileging activities by hospitals are not covered by the MPLA. 703 Given
the lower caps of MPLA III, and the elimination of ostensible agency and joint
and several liability, it is likely the plaintiff s bar will aggressively pursue "nonMPLA" claims.
Outside the emergency room context, ostensible agency is tightened up,
and MPLA III eliminates it. However, there is sure to be litigation over whether
a particular doctor's insurance satisfies the statutory requirement, both for the
imposition of ostensible agency and for application of the noneconomic damage
caps. Experts continue to be handled on a case-by-case basis, 704 and more peer

698

W. VA. R. EVID. 408.

699

W. VA. R. EVID. 409.

One interesting issue is whether this statute will stand challenge in light of the Court's decisions in Louk v. Cormier, 622 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2005) and Mayhorn v. Logan Med Found,
454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994), in which the Court reversed legislation as infringing upon its constitutional rule-making power.
701
Louk, 622 S.E.2d 788.
702
Boggs v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp., 609 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 2004).
703
See Carter v. Teays Valley Health, No. 03-C-216 (Cir. Ct. Putnam Cnty. Mar. 11, 2005).
704
As to the qualification issue, Kiser II is probably the best read at this point as establishing
the line at which (or below which) the court will find an expert's qualifications do not suffice to
allow testimony in a MPLA case.
700
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review/privilege litigation is surely coming. The next several years will be interesting, to say the least, for MPLA litigators.
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